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I. INTRODUCTION
Voting is a fundamental right protected by the federal and state constitutions,
and it is a hallmark of our democracy. However, the states have authority to
regulate their election processes, including defining who is eligible to vote. In
determining eligibility, states cannot fix voter qualifications that "invidiously
discriminate."' When a state allows some to vote but not others, the exclusion
must be necessary to promote a compelling state interest.2 This high
constitutional standard has required voting reforms to eradicate discrimination by
race, previous servitude, class, and gender.' One category of persons whose right
* Ms. Hurme is a Senior Project Manager for AARP Financial Security and an associate professorial
lecturer at George Washington University School of Law, Washington, DC.
** Dr. Appelbaum is the Elizabeth K. Dollard Professor of Psychiatry, Medicine and Law, and Director,
Division of Psychiatry, Law and Ethics, Department of Psychiatry, Columbia University College of Physicians
and Surgeons, New York, New York.
1. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (holding that Virginia's poll tax violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
2. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (holding that durational residency requirements violate the
Equal Protection Clause because they were unnecessary to promote a compelling interest, either to prevent
fraudulent voting by non-residents or to further the goal of having knowledgeable voters).
3. Kay Schriner et al., The Last Suffrage Movement: Voting Rights for Persons with Cognitive and
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to vote deserves closer attention is those with cognitive disabilities . While
federal election law permits state laws to disenfranchise persons "by reason
of... mental incapacity,"5 serious questions are raised as to who is mentally
incapable of voting and whether existing laws address any genuine state interest
in protecting the electoral process from fraud -or reaching the goal of an
intelligent electorate.6 Rather than the concerns about incompetent voting and
fraud prevention, the emphasis should be on expanding the franchise and
enhancing access to and assistance with the ballot for all persons who are capable
of voting. If there is to be any limitation based on incapacity, it should be
narrowly circumscribed in terms of a specific focus on the capacity to understand
the nature and effect of voting, rather than on categorical exclusions. Further, the
assessment of voting capacity, if necessary, must be made in a judicial pro-
ceeding that affords challenged voters their due process rights.'
A predicate to examining the voting rights of persons with cognitive
impairments is an understanding of the current status of the law. This article
examines state constitutional provisions and electoral laws that pertain to
excluding persons with cognitive impairments, superimposes recent reforms in
guardianship law that elucidate a more contemporary understanding of the nature
of mental impairments, calls for specific judicial assessment of an individual's
ability to participate in the electoral process, and provides the courts with an
approach to the nondiscriminatory assessment of the ability of a person with
diminished capacity in other areas to retain the fundamental right to vote.
While states have an interest in protecting the electoral process from fraud
and encouraging an intelligent electorate, excluding the broad and indefinite
category of persons with mental incapacities is not consistent with either the
constitutional right to vote without discrimination or the current understanding of
mental capacity. Part II of this article examines the extent to which state
constitutions do or do not exclude persons with cognitive impairments from
voting. Part III analyzes state election laws. Although previous authors tend to
present a bleak picture of the extent of disenfranchisement of those with
cognitive disabilities,' a closer examination of the constitutional and electoral law
provisions reveals positive movement toward expanding the right to vote to
Emotional Disabilities, 27 PUBLIUs 75, 75 (1997).
4. Note, Mental Disability and the Right to Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979). Cognitive disabilities could
include any of a number of disabilities that affect mental function, including mental illness, mental retardation,
developmental disabilities, brain injuries, and the dementias.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(a)(3)(B) (2000).
6. Other articles prepared for this Symposium on voting and persons with cognitive disabilities more
closely examine the constitutional ramifications of discriminating against persons with mental incapacity. See,
e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, The Voting Rights of Cognitively Impaired Individuals, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 917
(2007).
7. Recommendations of the Symposium, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 861 (2007).
8. See Kingshuk K. Roy, Note, Sleeping Watchdogs of Personal Liberty: State Laws Disenfranchising
the Elderly, 11 ELDER L.J. 109 (2003); Schriner et al., supra note 3; Note, supra note 4.
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include some persons who previously would have been excluded because of their
categorization as mentally disabled. The glass may be half-full rather than half-
empty.
Contributing to the half-full approach of this article are the reforms appearing
in guardianship laws discussed in Part IV. Over the past decade, guardianship
law has undergone a substantial transformation and now recognizes that mental
capacity is not an all or nothing, black or white categorization. In a wave of
legislative reform beginning in the 1990s, states have developed more refined
definitions of those who need to be identified as legally "incapacitated." Most
guardianship reforms have recognized that individuals who may need the
protection of the state in some decision-making areas can retain their rights in
other areas. Guardianship courts have turned to tailoring their orders to allow for
a more limited deprivation of rights than the previous wholesale relegation of an
incompetent person to the legal status of an infant. In most states, before a person
can be placed under guardianship, there must be a fairly comprehensive
assessment of what they can or cannot do and why their disability puts them at a
sufficient risk for harm, such that the appointment of a guardian is necessary.
In a growing number of states, part of the guardianship process requires a
determination of what rights the individual can retain, including the right to vote.
In Part V, the positive reforms in state guardianship laws preserving the rights of
persons under guardians are overlaid on negative state constitutional and election
law provisions that restrict the right to vote. This opens avenues for advocates to
argue that while an "idiot or insane person" 9 cannot vote, a person who is
incapable, under guardianship law, to make decisions about person or property is
not disenfranchised. The state-by-state analysis intertwines constitutional
provisions, election laws, and guardianship statutes to determine the likelihood
that persons with cognitive impairments retain the right to vote under current
law. Thirty-two states now specifically provide for some judicial determination
of whether an individual has the capacity to vote. The laws in an additional
eleven states and the District of Columbia can be interpreted as giving persons
with cognitive disabilities an implied right to a determination that they retain the
right to vote. In the remaining seven states, if the individual has been judicially
determined to be incapacitated, that person loses the right to vote without an
opportunity to argue that he or she understands the voting process and wants to
exercise the franchise.
Although a total of forty-four jurisdictions could be making determinations
of whether persons with cognitive impairments may vote, Part VI highlights the
scarcity of direction as to when and how this right is adjudicated. In addition to
determining whether the individual does not have the capacity to make decisions
about where she lives, what medical care she should receive, and whether she can
manage her money, guardianship courts may be called upon to determine
9. See infra note 18.
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whether the individual should lose the constitutional right to vote. Determining
whether someone can competently vote entails a different assessment than
whether the person can manage personal finances, make a medical decision, or
care for personal safety.
Part VII of this article provides courts with a mechanism to enable them to
make that specific determination when necessitated by current law. The
Competence Assessment Tool for Voting (CAT-V) was designed to provide a
consistent standard that can be relied upon to evaluate whether the individual
understands the nature and purpose of casting a ballot. This Section concludes by
raising important questions about the circumstances that should trigger such
screening, the contexts in which it should occur, and the identity of the persons
who should conduct it. Underlying these questions are concerns that
indiscriminate screening may result in the general disenfranchisement of the
elderly and other persons with cognitive impairments, or in selective deletion of
persons from the voting rolls for partisan gain.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS REGARDING CAPACITY TO VOTE
The constitutions of every state '° except Pennsylvania and Connecticut" have
articles that exclude certain categories of persons from eligibility to register and
vote. Along with criminals'3 who have been convicted of treason, 4 bribery,'5
10. The District of Columbia does not have a constitution.
11. PA. CONST. art. Vi, § 1 ("Every citizen twenty-one years of age [who is a citizen of the United
States, resided in the state, and resided in the election district] shall be entitled to vote at all elections subject,
however, to such laws requiring and regulating the registration of electors as the General Assembly may
enact."). The General Assembly has provided that individuals "confined in a penal institution for a conviction of
a felony within the last five years" are not eligible to register to vote. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1301(a) (West
2007). "Every citizen of the United States who has attained the age of eighteen years, who is a bona fide
resident of the town in which he seeks to be admitted as an elector and who takes such oath, if any, as may be
prescribed by law, shall be qualified to be an elector." CONN. CONST. art. 6, § 1, amended by CONN. CONST.
amend. IX.
12. See Appendix A, col. B.
13. [Mlost states impose some voting restrictions on people with felony convictions, ranging from
a prohibition from voting while incarcerated to a virtual lifetime ban. In 2004, these laws were
responsible for directly denying 5.3 million Americans their right to vote . . . [Thirteen] states
disfranchise their citizens after completion of their sentences .... [Sleven states require permanent
disfranchisement under certain circumstances. Twelve states and the District of Columbia allow
those on parole and probation to vote and another five states disfranchise parolees, but allow
probationers to vote .... In August 2001, the National Commission on Federal Election Reform...
recommended that all states restore voting rights to citizens who have fully served their
sentences ... . In July 2006, the United Nations Human Rights Committee condemned the U.S.'s
disfranchisement policies and called for the extension of voting rights to all individuals upon release
from prison .... [S]ixteen states have implemented reforms since 1997 resulting in the restoration of
voting rights to approximately 621,400 individuals.
DEMOS, CHALLENGES TO FAIR ELECTIONS 4, THE CASE AGAINST FELONY DISFRANCHISEMENT (2006),
http://www.demos.org/pubs/CFE-felonydis- I102406.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
14. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. VH1, § 2(C) ("No person who is adjudicated an incapacitated person shall
be qualified to vote at any election, nor shall any person convicted of treason or felony, be qualified to vote at
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election fraud,16 and other infamous crimes," are those persons deemed to have a
mental condition or status that precludes them from voting. Nine state
constitutions exclude from voting those who are "idiot[s] or insane,"'8 two bar
those of unsound mind,'9 and three prevent persons who are non compos mentis
20from voting. Missouri's constitution excludes those who have been adjudged
incapacitated or are involuntarily admitted to a mental institution, while the
Kansas constitution permits the legislature to prevent those with mental illness
from voting.22 Similarly, Wisconsin's constitution allows the legislature to
disenfranchise voters that are adjudged mentally incompetent.23 Sixteen states
constitutionally bar those who are or who have been adjudged mentally• • 24
incompetent or incapacitated. Four constitutions exclude those who are "under
any election unless restored to civil rights.").
15. See, e.g., N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. XI ("No person shall have the right to vote under the constitution of
this state who has been convicted of treason, bribery or any willful violation of the election laws of this state or
of the United States ....").
16. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 116.025(1) (West 2006) ("Any person who shall have been
convicted of any election law offense which is a felony shall not be permitted to vote until his or her civil rights
have been restored by executive pardon."). Until amended in 1996, the Alabama Constitution had an extensive
list of persons barred from voting.
The following persons shall be disqualified both from registering, and from voting, namely: All
idiots and insane persons; those who shall by reason of conviction of crime be disqualified from
voting at the time of the ratification of this Constitution; those who shall be convicted of treason,
murder, arson, embezzlement, malfeasance in office, larceny, receiving stolen property, obtaining
property or money under false pretenses, perjury, subornation of perjury, robbery, assault with intent
to rob, burglary, forgery, bribery, assault and battery on the wife, bigamy, living in adultery,
sodomy, incest, rape, miscegenation, crime against nature, or any crime punishable by imprisonment
in the penitentiary, or of any infamous crime or crime involving moral turpitude; also, any person
who shall be convicted as a vagrant or tramp, or of selling or offering to sell his vote or the vote of
another, or of buying or offering to buy the vote of another, or of making or offering to make a false
return in any election by the people or in any primary election to procure the nomination or election
of any person to any office, or of suborning any witness or registrar to secure the registration of any
person as an elector.
ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182, repealed by ALA. CONST. amend. 579. Under the current constitution, "[n]o
person convicted of a felony involving moral turpitude, or who is mentally incompetent, shall be qualified to
vote until restoration of civil and political rights or removal of disability." ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 177(b).
17. See, e.g., IOWA CONST. art. II, § 5 ("No idiot, or insane person, or person convicted of any infamous
crime, shall be entitled to the privilege of an elector.").
18. See ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5; IOWA CONST. art. 11, § 5; Ky. CONST. § 145, cl. 3; MINN. CONST. art.
VII, § 1; MISS. CONST. art. Xii, § 241; NEV. CONST. art. II, § I (amended 2005); N.J. CONST. art. II, § 1, para.
6; N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. V, § 6.
19. See ALASKA CONST. art. V, § 2; MONT. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
20. See HAW. CONST. art. II, § 2; NEB. CONST. art. VI, § 2; R.I. CONST. art. II, § 1.
21. See MO. CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
22. See KAN. CONST. art. V, § 2. However, the legislature has not done so.
23. WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2.
24. See ARIZ. CONST. art. VII, § 2(C); CAL. CONST. art. II, § 4; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2; FLA. CONST.
art. VI, § 4; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 3(b); LA. CONST. art. 1, § 10(A); MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 1; N.D.
CONST. art. II, § 2; S.C. CONST. art. II, § 7; S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 2; TEx. CONST. art. VI, § 1; UTAH CONST.
art. IV, § 6; VA. CONST. art. II, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. VI, § 3; W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1; WYO. CONST. art.
6, § 6.
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guardianship."' Under Oregon's constitution, "[a] person suffering from a
mental handicap is entitled to the full rights of an elector, if otherwise qualified,
unless the person has been adjudicated incompetent to vote as provided by law."
26
Vermont excludes those who are not "of quiet and peaceable behavior.,
27
From a rote examination of state constitutional provisions, it would appear
that sweeping, yet imprecise, categories of persons are disenfranchised. Looking
solely at constitutional provisions, only California, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Maine, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Vermont have no constitutional disenfran-
chisement provision for persons with a category of mental impairment or
disability . However, the states' election laws outline a somewhat different
profile of those who are prevented from voting because of a mental status.
III. ELECTION LAW PROVISIONS REGARDING CAPACITY TO VOTE
The state election laws that contain provisions for voter disenfranchisement
on cognitive grounds do not necessarily track the categories of excluded voters
mentioned in state constitutions. Some states narrow their constitutional
disenfranchisement provisions, and one state adds mental incapacity as an
ineligibility category.' 9 In all but fourteen states, different terminology is used in
state election laws and state constitutions to describe persons ineligible to vote
because of cognitive impairment.0 A possible explanation for this divergence
25. See ME. CONST. art. II, § 1; MASS. CONST. art. III; MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 1; MO. CONST. art.
VIII, § 2. Maine's constitutional provision removing persons under guardianship for reasons of mental illness
from qualification as an elector, ME. CONST. Art. II, § 1, was held unconstitutional by Doe v. Rowe, 156 F.
Supp. 2d 35, 59 (D. Me. 2001).
26. OR. CONST. art. II, § 3.
27. VT. CONST. ch. II, § 42 ("Every person of the full age of eighteen years who is a citizen of the
United States, having resided in this State for the period established by the General Assembly and who is of a
quiet and peaceable behavior, and will take the following oath or affirmation, shall be entitled to all the
privileges of a voter of this state . . ."). Vermont Secretary of State Deborah Markowitz stated in informal
remarks at the Symposium that this was not a competency standard; rather, it was designed to facilitate
peaceable conduct at town meetings.
28. See Appendix A, col. B. Idaho's constitution originally barred an "idiot or insane person" from
voting. The prohibition was changed to "under guardianship" in 1982. In 1998, the constitution was again
amended to drop any reference to mental capacity. See IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3.
29. See Appendix A, col. C. New York's election law expands the constitutional categories of those who
are unqualified to vote. Under New York's constitution, "[tihe legislature shall enact laws excluding from the
right of suffrage all persons convicted of bribery or of any infamous crime." N.Y. CONST. art. II, § 3. New
York's election law includes the additional provision that "[n]o person who has been adjudged incompetent by
order of a court of competent judicial authority shall have the right to register for or vote at any election in this
state unless thereafter he shall have been adjudged competent pursuant to law." N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 5.106(6)
(McKinney 1998) (emphasis added).
30. The fourteen states in which terminology is consistent are: Arizona (adjudicated incapacitated),
California (mentally incompetent), Maryland (under guardianship for mental disability), Massachusetts (under
guardianship), Mississippi (idiot, insane), Missouri (mentally incapacitated), Montana (unsound mind),
Nebraska (non compos mentis), South Carolina (mental incompetence), South Dakota (mental incompetence),
Texas (mentally incompetent), Virginia (mentally incompetent), Wisconsin (specifically incompetent to vote),
936
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between constitution and statute may be that states have found it easier to
legislate improvements to enfranchisement criteria than to amend constitutions.
Only Mississippi excludes "idiots" as eligible voters in its election laws,3
even though nine state constitutions use that term.32 For example, Nevada's
election law ignores its constitutional phrasing of "idiot" and directs the county
clerk to "cancel the [voter] registration . . . [i]f the insanity or mental
incompetence of the person registered is legally established. 33 Kentucky's statute
directs its election officials to remove from the voter rolls any person who has
been declared incompetent,4 but the statute does not use the constitutional
terminology of "idiots and insane persons., 3 - New Mexico has bypassed the
"idiot" classification found in its constitution 36 and has the county clerk cancel
certificates of registration for the reason of the voter's legal insanity.37
Two states appear to ignore constitutional provisions in their election laws
that specifically delineate those who are ineligible to vote. North Dakota's
constitution states that "[n]o person who has been declared mentally incompetent
by order of a court ...shall be qualified to vote. 38 However, its election law
only bars voting by persons convicted and sentenced for treason or felony.39
Likewise, Utah's constitution provides that "[a]ny mentally incompetent person.
. . may not be permitted to vote at any election or be eligible to hold office in this
State until the right to vote or hold elective office is restored as provided by
statute. 4° In its election law, Utah allows any person to apply to register to vote
who "is a citizen of the United States; ... has been a resident of Utah for at least
the [thirty] days immediately before the election; . . .and will be at least
[eighteen] years old on the day of the election.' It then specifically states in the
exception section that:
A person who is involuntarily confined or incarcerated in a jail, prison,
or other facility within a voting precinct is not a resident of that voting
precinct and may not register to vote in that voting precinct unless the
person was a resident of that voting precinct before the confinement or
incarceration. . . .A person who has been convicted of a felony whose
and Wyoming (mentally incompetent).
31. MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-11 (1972 & Supp. 2003).
32. See supra note 18.
33. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293.540 (LexisNexis 2002).
34. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 116.113 (West 2006).
35. See KY. CONST. § 145.
36. See N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
37. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-4-26, 1-4-24(B) (West 2003).
38. N.D. CONST. art. II, § 2.
39. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-01-04.4 (2004).
40. UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6.
41. UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-2-101(1) (2003).
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right to vote has not been restored as provided by law may not register to
vote.42
No mention is made of mentally incompetent persons in the exceptions to
eligibility for registration.
In 1996, Alaska repealed its election law that disqualified voters for unsound
mind,43 despite its constitutional provision that "[n]o person may vote who has
been judicially determined to be of unsound mind unless the disability has been
removed." Florida's constitution states that "[n]o person ... adjudicated in this
or any other state to be mentally incompetent, shall be qualified to vote or hold
office until restoration of civil rights or removal of disability. ' 45 However, the
election law on voter registration qualifications narrows the exclusion only to
those who have been adjudicated mentally incapacitated with respect to 
voting.46
Comparing West Virginia's constitutional phrasing to its election law
wording raises the question whether there was any intentional effort to
distinguish whom it is making ineligible to vote. The constitution states that "no
person who ... has been declared mentally incompetent by a court of competent
",47
jurisdiction ... shall be permitted to vote while such disability continues ....
Under the election laws, no person who is "of unsound mind ... shall be
permitted to vote at such election while such disability continues. Without the
legislative history, it is difficult to ascertain whether the legislature equated
''mental incompetence" with being of "unsound mind," a variation on the same
theme, or separate categories of ineligible voters were intended.49
42. Id. § 20A-2-101(2).
43. ALASKA STAT. § 15.05.040 (repealed 1996).
44. ALASKA CONST. art. 5, § 2.
45. FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (emphasis added). Florida's constitution was amended in 1868 to remove
"under guardianship, non compos mentis or insane" as persons prohibited from voting. Schriner et al., supra
note 3, at 77.
46. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 97.041(2) (West 2002) ("The following persons, who might be otherwise
qualified, are not entitled to register or vote: (a) A person who has been adjudicated mentally incapacitated with
respect to voting in this or any other state and who has not had his or her ight to vote restored pursuant to
law.") (emphasis added).
47. W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (emphasis added).
48. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-1-3 (West 2002) (emphasis added).
49. To add to the variety of terminology, the West Virginia guardianship code uses the terminology of
"protected person."
"Protected person" means an adult individual, eighteen years of age or older, who has been found
by a court, because of mental impairment, to be unable to receive and evaluate information
effectively or to respond to people, events, and environments to such an extent that the individual
lacks the capacity: (A) To meet the essential requirements for his or her health, care, safety,
habilitation, or therapeutic needs without the assistance or protection of a guardian; or (B) to manage
property or financial affairs or to provide for his or her support or for the support of legal dependents
without the assistance or protection of a conservator. A finding that the individual displays poor
judgment, alone, is not sufficient evidence that the individual is a protected person within the
meaning of this subsection.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44A-1-4(13) (LexisNexis 1997 & Supp. 2003). Kentucky, similarly, uses different
terminology in its constitution, election laws, and guardianship laws. Compare Ky. CONST. § 145 ("idiots and
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What should be made of election statutes that ignore or modify constitutional
provisions restricting the franchise for certain classifications of ineligible voters?
Are the election statutes of Alaska, Florida, Kentucky, Nevada, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Utah, and West Virginia vulnerable to constitutional challenge
because they do not specifically exclude "idiots" or "incompetent persons" as
disqualified voters, because they narrow or modify the exclusion, or because they
use different terminology than their constitutions?50 It is left to the respective
state courts to resolve any challenges on these grounds, as none have been made
to date." Advocates who seek to limit the categories of persons who are
disenfranchised may argue that the antiquated and pejorative "idiot"
terminology 2 in the constitutions is so non-definitive and archaic that the
legislatures in enacting more specific and contemporary language have better
reflected the will of the people in defining who should or should not vote.53
Likewise, those states that have narrowed or modified the broad category of
''mental incompetent" persons in their election statutes are perhaps subtly
avoiding constitutional challenge on equal protection grounds by bringing their
constitutions up to date with more acceptable and precise categorizations of
persons deemed unable to vote. Society's perception and treatment of the
mentally disabled and the elderly have changed substantially since the time that
most constitutions and election statutes were written. As discussed below, several
states are expanding and even encouraging the right of democratic participation
to persons who only a few decades ago would have been categorically deemed
unqualified to express their choice at the polling place.54
On the other hand, the precise wording of state constitutions or statutes can
be decisive in identifying who is intended to be excluded from voting. For
example, under a Maine law, before it was held unconstitutional in Doe v. Rowe,
persons under guardianship for mental illness could not register or vote.
However, persons under guardianship for reasons other than mental illness, such
insane persons"), with KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 116.113(2) (West 2006) (removal from rolls if "declared
incompetent"), and id. § 387.510(8) ("Disabled... refers to any person fourteen ... years of age or older who
is: ... [u]nable to make informed decisions with respect to his personal affairs to such an extent that he lacks
the capacity to provide for his physical health and safety, including but not limited to health care, food, shelter,
clothing, or personal hygiene ....").
50. See Kay Schriner & Lisa A. Ochs, Creating the Disabled Citizen: How Massachusetts Disenfran-
chised People under Guardianship, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 481, 484 n.7 (2001).
51. The Missouri Constitution is currently being challenged, but on different grounds. See infra Part VI
(discussing Mo. Prot. & Advocacy Servs., Inc. v. Carnahan, No. 06-3014 (8th Cir. 2007), on appeal sub. noma.
from Prye v. Carnahan, No. 04-4248-CV-C-ODS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46176 (W.D. Mo. July 7, 2004)).
52. See Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35, 54 (D. Me. 2001) (rejecting the State's suggestion that
"probate courts can properly place persons with modern day diagnoses within the stigmatizing confines of terms
such as "idiotic," "lunatic," or "unsoundness of mind").
53. Schriner et al., supra note 3, at 77 ("Some states have revised earlier constitutional or statutory
language either to reflect more modem perspectives on the nature of incompetency or to defer to changing
terminological preferences.").
54. See infra Part V (discussing various state provisions related to guardianship and the right to vote).
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as mental retardation, or who were mentally ill but not under guardianship, were
eligible to vote.5"
Twenty-eight states' election laws do not comment on voter eligibility due to
mental status.56 This may well be because the constitutional statement is deemed
to be dispositive of who is-or is not eligible to vote in the state without further
legislative statement in the election laws. Of note are two states where the
constitutions give the legislature the authority to bar citizens from voting because
of mental illness or mental incompetence, but the legislature has failed to do so.
The Kansas constitution permits the legislature to "exclude persons from voting
because of mental illness . . . ."" The legislature has not so done, requiring voters
to be U.S. citizens and age eighteen and older. 8 Similarly, under the Michigan
Constitution, "[t]he legislature may by law exclude persons from voting because
of mental incompetence . . . . 9 The legislature has not defined "mental
incompetence" for the purpose of voting.6°
Of those twenty-eight states with no mental-status criteria in their election
law provisions, eight have no constitutional mention of ineligibility due to mental
status.6' The remaining twenty do have some constitutional bar to voting by
persons who may be considered unqualified voters because of a mental
classification.
Court Interpretation of Voter Disqualification. Much of the analysis of
constitutions and statutes depends on a close examination of the precise wording
used. Further, elections officials need to be able to identify those who may be
categorically ineligible to register or cast a ballot. Who is an idiot or of unsound
mind? What does non compos mentis mean? Who determines that someone is
mentally incapacitated? Is a person with dementia insane, mentally ill, mentally
incapacitated, or cognitively impaired? And do any of those categorizations have
any relationship to the ability to exercise the right to vote? The vagueness of the
terms "insane," "non compos mentis," and "idiocy" in describing those
disqualified from voting creates uncertainty in the law governing voting capacity.
There is little case law interpreting these vague provisions that can deny the
mentally incapacitated the right to vote.62
55. Doe, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 44.
56. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, and
Washington.
57. KAN. CONST. art V, § 2.
58. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-2309(b)(15)-(16) (2000 & Supp. 2006).
59. MICH. CONST. art II, § 2.
60. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.10 (West 1989).
61. Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Vermont.
62. See Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3D
1116, 1119-20 (1977).
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Non Compos Mentis. In 1878, an Illinois court refuted a challenge that a
voter was "non compos mentis" by "stating that a person who is capable of doing
ordinary work and transacting business, who knows the value of money, makes
his own contracts and does his own trading cannot be denied the privilege of the
elective franchise . . . "6 The court went on to note that "the right to vote cannot
be denied on account of mental incapacity . . . merely because [the person] is
easily persuaded, or . . . laboring under some kind of illusion, given that the
illusion did not incapacitate him [from] the general management of business or
extend to political matters." 6
Illinois courts returned to the issue of voter disqualification in 1907 in Welch
v. Shumway.6' The court held that when a voter was challenged on the ground of
being "non compos mentis," it was necessary to establish, "by competent
evidence, the alleged want of intelligence." 66 The court suggested that the test for
capacity to vote would probably be similar to the test used to determine whether
a testator was of unsound mind when executing a will. If a voter knows enough
to understand the nature of his act of voting and understands what he is doing, the
voter would not be excluded from voting as being non compos mentis.
In a Wisconsin case involving a petition to annex a state-owned facility for
mentally deficient persons and raising the question of whether the facility's
residents were qualified to vote, the court construed the then-used wording "non
compos mentis" "as a generic term that include[ed] mental deficiency as well as
insanity. 6 s It noted that the dictionary definition of "non compos mentis"
referred to a complete lack of "mental capacity to understand the nature,
consequences, and effect of a situation or transaction." 69 By excluding from
voting persons who are non compos mentis, "the constitution and the statute
intend[ed] that [all] persons who are mentally incapable of knowing or
understanding the nature and objective of the elective question should not be
eligible to vote."7° The court went on to find that because all of the voters in
question had either been committed or voluntarily admitted to a state-owned
63. Id. at 1124 (discussing Clark v. Robinson, 88 I11. 498 (1878)). In a case involving the question as to
whether a voter was an idiot or an insane person, an Arkansas court used a similar functional test of what the
voter could do. Although the voter was regarded by the community as mentally deficient and could not read or
write, "he had voted in previous elections, had a bank account, and had transacted business without the aid of a
guardian." Id. at 1127. Even with very low mentality, he was not an idiot or insane. Youngblood v. Thorn, 224
S.W. 962 (Ark. 1920).
64. Clark v. Robinson, 88 Ill. 498 (1878); Smith, supra note 62, at 1124.
65. 83 N.E. 549 (I11. 1907).
66. Id. at 558.
67. See id.
68. Town of Lafayette v. City of Chippewa Falls, 235 N.W.2d 435, 441 (Wis. 1975). This terminology
is no longer used in Wisconsin. "Laws may be enacted ... [e]xcluding from the right of suffrage persons ...
[a]djudged by a court to be incompetent or partially incompetent, unless the judgment specifies that the person
is capable of understanding the objective of the elective process or the judgment is set aside." WIS. CONST. art.
II, § 2.
69. Town of Lafayette, 235 N.W.2d at 441.
70. Id.
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facility for the care, custody, and training of mentally deficient persons, there
was a rebuttable presumption of incompetence. Because there was no evidence
that any one of them was not mentally deficient, all resident-patients were
ineligible electors.7
Idiot and Insane. In 1905, an Ohio court examined the terms "idiot" and
"insane person" in a challenge to a referendum approving the sale of intoxicating
liquors., A vote was cast by a person who had "all conditions attendant upon
complete imbecility ... [and who] showed an absolute lack of knowledge of the
proper way to mark his ballot ... ,72 At the time this case was decided in the
early twentieth century, "idiocy" referred to "mental feebleness due to disease or
defect of brain, congenital or acquired during development" causing lack of
understanding from nativity.73 "Insanity" was a general term that included idiocy,
lunacy, imbecility, weak-mindedness, and feeblemindedness, as well as disease
or defect of the brain, or the inability to distinguish between right and wrong.74
The court held that the voter in question was disqualified as an "idiot or insane
person. 7 1 It was undisputed, according to the court, that the voter was "a person
of diseased mind, of limited mental capacity, incapable of carrying on in an
intelligent manner the ordinary affairs of life, having no distinct ideas upon the
question of morality, . . . and one who would probably not be [held] responsible
for any criminal act .. .
In 1962, an Ohio court returned to the question of the meaning of "idiot and
insane," a century after the 1851 Ohio Constitution selected that terminology to
identify persons disqualified from voting.71 Under Ohio law, a juror must have
the qualifications of an eligible voter. Voters were disqualified if they were an
idiot or insane."m A jury's decision was challenged in a motion for a new trial on
the ground that one of the jurors should have been disqualified because he had a
record of hospitalization for mental illness. The court began its analysis by noting
that the common meaning of idiot-a person who has been without
understanding from his nativity and who the law presumes is never likely to
attain any-had not significantly changed over time. 79 "Insane person" referred to
"a person who has suffered such a deprivation of reason that he is no longer
capable of understanding and acting with discretion and judgment in the ordinary
affairs of life. ' Moving beyond the historical definitions of those terms, the
71. Id. at 443. See infra note 131 and accompanying text (discussing Wisconsin's new statutory
provisions regarding voter eligibility).
72. In re S. Charleston Election Contest, 3 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 373, 389 (Prob. Ct. 1905).
73. See id. at 386.
74. See id. at 387.
75. Id. at 388-90.
76. Id. at 388-89.
77. See Baker v. Keller, 15 Ohio Misc. 215 (Ct. Com. PI. 1968).
78. Id. at 219.
79. Id. at 229.
80. Id.
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court applied contemporary understandings of mental illness. Some persons, who
once had normal reason, may become permanently insane, while for others, the
loss of their perception or reason can fluctuate over time. "During . . . lucid
intervals such persons commonly exercise every characteristic of normality
associated with all those persons who have never, even for a short period, been
deprived of their normal reasoning faculties." 8' In any event, an accurate
diagnosis of a person's mental illness or capacity requires the "help of a highly
trained professional-usually a psychiatrist, although the highly qualified
psychologists and social workers on the staffs of mental health clinics and family
service agencies can do quite competent preliminary diagnostic work where
physical ailments are not involved in the emotional or mental disease. 82 The
court also noted that the Ohio mental illness statutes, largely rewritten and
modernized during the ten years prior to the decision, no longer used the
terminology of idiot or insane person.8 ' Although the juror in question had
previously been hospitalized for manic-depressive reaction, he had never been
adjudicated incompetent nor had a guardian been appointed for him.4 Therefore,
he had the qualifications of an elector and should not have been excluded as a
juror.85
Feeblemindedness. Although no constitution or electors' statute currently
uses "feeblemindedness due to old age," this ageist concept was rejected by two
courts long before discrimination against older voters became a concern. In 1869,
Ohio recognized that old age was not a legal disqualification from voting,
holding that the challenged voter was neither "a lunatic [n]or an idiot, but simply
a man whose mind [was] greatly enfeebled by age. 816 In a 1907 challenge to the
rejection of an elderly man's vote on account of his mental enfeeblement because
of his age, an Illinois court noted "that many persons who are failing mentally on
account of old age are some days very much brighter than at other times. 87
Because the voter knew what he was doing on the day he voted, could understand
the nature of his act, and indicated a sound mind in answering questions at the
polling place, he was entitled to vote.88
Under Guardianship. Although the phrasing "under guardianship" currently
only appears in four state constitutions, 9 its historical use has been subjected to
interpretation by several courts. In all but one case, the courts have restricted its
definition to the specific application of guardianship law. In Town of Lafayette v.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 228.
83. id. at 231.
84. Id. at 232.
85. Id. at 231.
86. Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio St. 306, 320 (1869).
87. Welch v. Shumway, 83 N.E. 549, 558 (Il. 1907).
88. Id.
89. Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Missouri.
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City of Chippewa Falls, in addition to finding that the residents of a state facility
for mentally deficient persons were presumed to be incompetent, the Wisconsin
court further deemed that the residents were "under guardianship," although there
was no evidence that they had been appointed guardiansi 0 Because the
guardianship provisions were in a separate section of the code, the court deemed
the statutory definition! of guardianship requiring *a court appointment to be
inapplicable to the electors' statute. 9' The court resorted to what it considered the
common and ordinary meaning of "guardian"-a person invested with the power
of taking care of the property and rights of another who is incapable of
administering his own affairs.92 Because the residents were under the care and
custody of the state, they were "under guardianship" and ineligible to sign the
annexation petition being challenged.93
In contrast, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court determined that
"under guardianship" was a term of art that required strict adherence to the
prescribed guardianship process. In Boyd v. Board of Registrars of Voters,
residents of a state facility for the mentally retarded challenged the board of
registrars' decision that they were ineligible to register because the constitution
and election laws disqualified persons "under guardianship. 94 The court noted
the significant distinction between guardianship and involuntary commitment.
Guardianship required a determination by a probate court that fixed the status of
the person as "an insane person incapable of taking care of himself," while
commitment justified the restraint of a person and did not fix his status or declare
him unable to manage his affairs.95 With regard to the hopeful registrants, they
neither had been declared incapable of managing their affairs nor involuntarily
committed for mental health treatment, and their admission to a residential
facility for those with mental retardation was wholly voluntary.96 Thus, they were
held to be eligible voters. 97
New Jersey came to a similar conclusion that admission to a facility for the
mentally retarded raised no presumption of incompetency that would disqualify
the residents from voting. In Carroll v. Cobb, residents of a state school for the
mentally retarded filed a class action to compel the town clerk and board of
elections to process their voter registration applications and allow them to vote.
98
The New Jersey Constitution and election laws withdraw suffrage from any idiot
90. 235 N.W.2d 435, 440-41 (Wis. 1975).
91. Id. at440.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 441.
94. 334 N.E.2d 629 (Mass. 1975). The exclusion of "persons under guardianship" was added to the
Massachusetts Constitution in 1821. Schriner & Ochs, supra note 50, at 490.
95. Id. at 632 (citations and quotations omitted).
96. Id. at 630.
97. Id. at 633.
98. 354 A.2d 355 (1976).
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or insane person.99 The Carroll court found that it was not within the municipal
clerk's authority or discretion to determine whether an applicant for registration
lacks sufficient mental capacity to vote. "[I]t should be abundantly evident that a
lay person is completely unequipped to determine whether an applicant
[registering to vote] is either an 'idiot' or an 'insane person' . . . . Indeed, we
suspect that those imprecise terms may be troublesome to experts in the fields of
psychiatry or psychology. '"'0° Additionally, mere residency at an institution for
the mentally retarded did not raise a presumption of idiocy.'0' The challenged
voters were eligible to vote.
Arizona also had the opportunity to determine if Native Americans living on
reservations were "under guardianship" as wards of the federal government and
thus among the categories of residents who were ineligible to vote.' 2 The court
stated, "to ascribe to all Indians residing on reservations the quality of being
'incapable of handling their own affairs in an ordinary manner' would be a grave
injustice .... "'C0 According to the court, whatever the relationship between the
Native Americans and the federal government, they did not have the status of
being "under guardianship" as the term was used in denying the right to vote. '
IV. GUARDIANSHIP LAW REFORM
When state guardianship laws are added to the analysis of whether a person
with any type of mental disability is eligible to vote, the puzzle becomes more
complex. In addition to the variables found in constitutional provisions and
election laws, guardianship statutes add a third variable that must be taken into
account. As discussed above, looking only at constitutional provisions or only at
elections laws does not adequately reveal whether someone with cognitive
impairments is eligible to vote.' 5 State guardianship laws open up an additional
99. New Jersey votes will have the opportunity during the November 2007 elections to consider
amending the Constitution to delete "idiot or insane person" and substitute "person who has been adjudicated by
a court of competent jurisdiction to lack the capacity to understand the act of voting." S. Con. Res. 134, 212th
Leg., 2d Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2007).
100. Id. at 359.
101. According to state law in effect at the time of the decision regarding patients in state hospitals or
schools, "there shall be no presumption of his incompetency or unsoundness of mind merely because of his
admission to a mental hospital." Id. at 359-60 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.2). See In re Absentee Ballots
Cast by Five Residents of Trenton Psychiatric Hosp., 750 A.2d 790 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2000) (holding that
involuntarily committed residents of a psychiatric hospital are presumed competent to vote and burden was on
the challenger to prove incompetency).
102. Harrison v. Laveen, 196 P.2d 456 (Ariz. 1948) (holding that American Indians were not "persons
under guardianship" and were eligible to register to vote).
103. Id. at 463.
104. id. at 461.
105. The Federal Elections Commission provides a state-by-state summary of voter eligibility, but in
some instances it inaccurately reflects constitutional or state election law. Fed. Elections Comm'n, Register to
Vote in Your State By Using This Postcard Form and Guide 3-27, http://www.fec.gov/votregis/pdf/nvra.pdf
(last visited May 31, 2007) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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avenue to address who is to be disenfranchised. Further, they provide the process
by whichthe actual determination of capacity to vote is made.
The guardianship court is one forum that makes the designation of mental
incapacity that can determine whether the individual may not vote. An additional
forum where the right to vote may be determined is in a civil commitment
proceeding that decides whether a person is dangerous to self or society and in
need of involuntary treatment in a mental institution. In those states that exclude
as voters those who are found to be insane, the finding of a need for mental
health treatment may lead to voter disqualification. Criminal proceedings in
which individuals are found mentally incapable of assisting in their defense or
being unable to form the necessary intent to commit a crime are another legal
avenue by which capacity is assessed and the right to vote may be lost.
The Guardianship Process. Guardianship is the state court process by which
someone is determined to be so incapacitated or mentally disabled that it is
necessary to remove their rights to make some or all decisions about their person
or property and delegate that decision-making authority to another person or
entity. The need for guardianship centers on the ability of allegedly incapacitated
persons to manage their own financial affairs and to make their own decisions
about their personal care. A central tension in each guardianship case is between
an individual's rights to self-determination and the appropriateness of society
stepping in to protect that individual, often from improvident actions and
irrational behaviors, by taking away decision-making rights.
Bearing in mind the caveat that guardianship laws and procedures vary
substantially from state to state, if not court to court, a basic description of how a
person is placed under the protection of the court provides a foundation for
examining these voting issues.' °6 Someone must file a petition with a court stating
the belief that the person is at risk, meets the state's definition of "incapacity,"
and needs the protection of a guardianship.' 7 Most states require some medical
documentation of the person's condition that puts the person or the person's
property at risk of harm. Many states have some pre-hearing procedures that
examine the allegations in the petition to verify that guardianship may be
appropriate and no less restrictive alternative is available. In most cases, counsel
is appointed and a hearing is held. The purpose of the hearing is to determine
whether the person's circumstances meet the state's definition of who is
106. See, for example, the discussion of Maine's guardianship process in Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d
35, 42 (D. Me. 2001) ("This background will lay the foundation for the Court's discussion of legal issues in
dispute."). The court noted that "Maine probate judges appear to disagree over their authority to reserve the
right to vote to a person placed under full guardianship." Id. at 43 ("[U]nder the current system, it appears that
the probability of a mentally ill person under guardianship having the fight to vote reserved depends more on
the individual probate judge hearing the case than on the ward's actual capacity to understand the nature and
effect of voting.").
107. See Appendix A, col. D for the terminology used in guardianship statutes to define the person in
need of guardianship.
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"incapacitated" or in need of a guardian0 8 and then to identify who should be
appointed to make decisions on behalf of that individual. If the hearing
determines a guardian is required, an order is entered. In some states, this order
grants the guardian full authority to make all decisions and terminates all rights
of the individual. Other states recognize that the individual has the capacity to
make some decisions, but not others, and limit the guardianship. The guardian's
authority may be limited to personal matters, such as residential placement or
medical decisions, or financial matters, such as the sale of real property,
management of investments, and expenditure of funds. In limited guardianships,
the guardian may be granted specific powers. Depending on the state's statutory
framework, all rights may be removed and delegated to the guardian except those
specifically remaining with the person found to be incapacitated (a ward),' °9 or
the ward may retain all rights except those specifically removed or granted to the
guardian.' ° The right to vote may be one of those rights adjudicated by the court.
The right to vote is personal and can never be delegated to another
individual. Under no guardianship theory, statute, or practice can the guardian
vote on behalf of his or her ward. The person under guardianship either has the
right to vote or it is lost. The Florida guardianship statute is one example that
explicitly recognizes that the right to vote cannot be delegated to the guardian."'
108. See Charles P. Sabatino & Suzanna L. Basinger, Competency: Reforming Our Legal Fictions, 6 J.
MENTAL HEALTH & AGING 119 (2000). This article offers an intriguing analysis of the many components and
their various combinations within states' definitions of "incapacity." The authors categorize definitions of
incapacity as 1) Status-based Tests: judicial determinations that the individual is a lunatic, insane person, person
of unsound mind, non compos mentis, or spendthrift; 2) Disabling Condition Tests: a medical approach that
requires the finding of a medical condition, such as mental illness, mental retardation, chronic use of drugs,
physical illness, or advanced age; 3) Functional Behavior Linked to Disability Condition Tests: link an inability
to manage one's property or person to the diagnosis; 4) More Finely Tuned Functional Behavior Tests: add tests
of inability to meet essential needs, or endangerment potential if no state intervention; 5) Cognitive Functioning
Tests: define inability in cognitive terms. Some states "mix and match" elements of various tests into the
definition of incapacity. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-26-01(2) (1996). No current state guardianship law
retains the status-based test, or terminology of lunatic, insane, persons or unsound mind, or non compos mentis
in the definition of incapacity. Only five states retain "advanced age" as a disabling condition. See ALA. CODE §
26-2A-20(8) (LexisNexis 1996); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-13-251 (1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35A- 1101 (2003)
(senility); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5-101 (1987 & Supp. 2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 3-1-10 l(a)(ix) (2003 & Supp.
2007).
109. See Appendix A, col. F.
110. See Appendix A, col. E.
111. The Florida guardianship statute categorizes rights that can be affected by a determination of
incapacity into those rights that the ward retains even under full guardianship, those rights that can be delegated
to the guardian, and those that may be removed from the ward, but not delegated to the guardian. See FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 744.3215 (West 2005 & Supp. 2007).
(I) A person who has been determined to be incapacitated retains the right: (a) To have an annual
review of the guardianship report and plan. (b) To have continuing review of the need for restriction
of his or her rights. (c) To be restored to capacity at the earliest possible time. (d) To be treated
humanely, with dignity and respect, and to be protected against abuse, neglect, and exploitation.
(e) To have a qualified guardian. (f) To remain as independent as possible, including having his or
her preference as to place and standard of living honored, either as he or she expressed or
demonstrated his or her preference prior to the determination of his or her incapacity or as he or she
currently expresses his or her preference, insofar as such request is reasonable. (g) To be properly
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Definitions of Incapacity. Within the realm of guardianship law, each state
has a specific definition of who is an incapacitated person, and thus in need of the
appointment of a guardian."2 These definitions pertain to guardianship and do not
contemplate the capacity to vote. For example, the Uniform Guardianship and
Protective Proceedings Act defines an "incapacitated person" as
any person who is impaired by reason of mental illness, mental
deficiency, mental disorder, physical illness or disability, chronic use of
drugs, chronic intoxication or other cause, except minority, to the extent
that he lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or
communicate responsible decisions concerning his person."'
Delaware imposes guardianship if the person:
[b]y reason of mental or physical incapacity is unable properly to
manage or care for their own person or property, or both, and, in
consequence thereof, is in danger of dissipating or losing such property
or of becoming the victim of designing persons or, in the case where a
guardian of the person is sought, such person is in danger of substantially
educated. (h) To receive prudent financial management for his or her property and to be informed
how his or her property is being managed, if he or she has lost the right to manage property. (i) To
receive services and rehabilitation necessary to maximize the quality of life. (j) To be free from
discrimination because of his or her incapacity. (k) To have access to the courts. (1) To counsel.
(in) To receive visitors and communicate with others. (n) To notice of all proceedings related to
determination of capacity and guardianship, unless the court finds the incapacitated person lacks the
ability to comprehend the notice. (o) To privacy. (2) Rights that may be removed from a person by
an order determining incapacity but not delegated to a guardian include the right: (a) To marry. If the
right to enter into a contract has been removed, the right to marry is subject to court approval. (b) To
vote. (c) To personally apply for government benefits. (d) To have a driver's license. (e) To travel.
(f) To seek or retain employment. (3) Rights that may be removed from a person by an order
determining incapacity and which may be delegated to the guardian include the right: (a) To
contract. (b) To sue and defend lawsuits. (c) To apply for government benefits. (d) To manage
property or to make any gift or disposition of property. (e) To determine his or her residence. (f) To
consent to medical and mental health treatment. (g) To make decisions about his or her social
environment or other social aspects of his or her life. (4) Without first obtaining specific authority
from the court .... a guardian may not: (a) Commit the ward to a facility, institution, or licensed
service provider without formal placement proceeding ... (b) Consent on behalf of the ward to the
performance on the ward of any experimental biomedical or behavioral procedure or to the
participation by the ward in any biomedical or behavioral experiment. The court may permit such
performance or participation only if: 1. It is of direct benefit to, and is intended to preserve the life of
or prevent serious impairment to the mental or physical health of the ward; or 2. It is intended to
assist the ward to develop or regain his or her abilities. (c) Initiate a petition for dissolution of
marriage for the ward. (d) Consent on behalf of the ward to termination of the ward's parental rights.
(e) Consent on behalf of the ward to the performance of a sterilization or abortion procedure on the
ward.
Id.
112. See Appendix A, col. D.
113. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5101 (2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.1105(a) (West
2002); UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP & PROTECTIVE PROCEEDING ACT § 102(5).
948
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 38
endangering [the] person's own health, or of becoming subject to abuse
114by other persons or of becoming the victim of designing persons....
In Maryland, being a disabled person in need of a guardian means:
[the] person lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or
communicate responsible decisions concerning his person, including
provisions for health care, food, clothing, or shelter, because of any
mental disability, disease, habitual drunkenness, or addiction to drugs,
and that no less restrictive form of intervention is available which is
consistent with the person's welfare and safety. " 5
These selected definitions illustrate the point that, in determining the need for
a guardian, the court focuses on the individual's ability to make decisions about
how to manage their property or take care of their personal or medical affairs.
Such emphasis on lack of self-care or financial management skills is not
dispositive of whether the individual understands the nature of the election
116
process.
Limited Guardianship. One wave of guardianship reform over the past two
decades has been to recognize that a person's abilities and capacities are variable
as to time and as to degree. For example, the person with developmental
disabilities, with proper training and habilitation, may be able to gain the ability
to make decisions about where to live and how to make appropriate monetary
decisions. A person with traumatic brain injury can regain the ability to make
medical decisions. Similarly, the person with early dementia may not be able to
make complex investment decisions, but can make personal decisions about daily
activities, what to eat, and whether to get a flu shot. In writing guardianship laws,
legislatures have moved away from plenary guardianships that reduce the adult to
the status of the "legally dead"" 7 or of an infant."8 Practically every state that has
revised its guardianship statute has favored limited guardianship," 9 with some
114. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3901(a)(2) (2001).
115. MD. CODE ANN. EST. & TRUSTS § 13-705(b) (LexisNexis 2001).
116. In the related circumstance of whether an incapacitated person under guardianship is an
incompetent witness, the Texas Court of Appeals has held that the guardianship statute's definition of
"incapacity" does not equate with "insanity or incompetency" under the state's evidence code. Kokes v.
Angelina Coll., 148 S.W.3d 384, 389 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the existence of a guardianship does
not automatically render a witness incompetent to give testimony).
117. Associated Press, Guardians of the Elderly: An Ailing System (1987). This series of articles by AP
reporters instigated many of the significant reforms to guardianship laws and coined the phrase "legally dead"
to refer to the status of many persons then under guardianship.
118. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5312(A) (2005) ("A guardian of an incapacitated person has
the same powers, rights and duties respecting the guardian's ward that a parent has respecting the parent's
unemancipated minor child ... ").
119. MARY JOY QUINN, GUARDIANSHIP OF ADULTS: ACHIEVING JUSTICE, AUTONOMY, AND SAFETY
152-53 (Helvi Gold & Brian Black eds., 2005); Sally Balch Hurme, Limited Guardianship: Its Implementation is
Long Overdue, 28 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 660, 660-69 (1994).
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states mandating a preference for orders that are tailored to the specific needs and
circumstances of the individual, that encourage maximum self-reliance and
independence, and that are necessitated by the protected person's limits.'
20
Nebraska's guardianship scheme goes beyond a preference for limited
guardianship and mandates that all guardianships must be limited "unless the
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a full guardianship is
necessary."''
z
V. GUARDIANSHIP LAW AND RETAINING THE RIGHT TO VOTE
Augmenting the reform movement requiring or allowing states to limit the
scope of authority delegated to a guardian, nineteen states have specific
provisions that persons under full or limited guardianship retain all legal and civil
rights not specifically taken away, which at least by implication would include
the right to vote. 122 When the guardianship law provisions that favor limits on the
removal of rights are examined, the argument can be made that persons in thirty-
two states found to be sufficiently incapacitated to need a guardian may be
eligible to vote under certain circumstances. 2 1 In these states, there is an implied
120. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-2A-105(a) (LexisNexis 1996) ("The court shall exercise the authority
conferred in this division so as to encourage the development of maximum self-reliance and independence of
the incapacitated person and make appointive and other orders only to the extent necessitated by the
incapacitated person's mental and adaptive limitations or other conditions warranting the procedure."). In
addition, Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Ohio, South Carolina, and Tennessee
permit limited guardianships.
121. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2620 (2002) ("If the court finds that a guardianship should be created, the
guardianship shall be a limited guardianship unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a full
guardianship is necessary. If a limited guardianship is created, the court shall, at the time of appointment or
later, specify the authorities and responsibilities which the guardian and ward, acting together or singly, shall
have .... ).
122. See Appendix D, col. E. All incapacitated persons in Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Maryland,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, and Utah retain all rights except
those specifically removed. Persons under limited guardianship in Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont retain all rights except those specifically removed. The guardianship
laws in Georgia and North Carolina reverse the presumption of retained rights, and allow the guardianship
courts to determine which rights a ward retains. See GA. CODE ANN. § 29-4-12(d)(5) (Supp. 2007); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 35A-1215(b) (2003).
123. See Appendix A, cols. E-F. Alabama (court may limit guardianship), Alaska (ward retains all legal
and civil rights), Arizona (may limit guardianship), Arkansas (retains all rights), California (may limit
conservatorship), Colorado (may limit guardianship), Florida (retains rights not removed), Georgia (determines
rights removed), Idaho (may limit guardianship), Illinois (removes specific rights), Indiana (may limit
guardianship), Iowa (may limit guardianship), Louisiana (limited interdictee retains all rights), Maine (limited
ward retains all rights), Maryland (retains all rights), Michigan (limited ward retains all rights), Minnesota
(retains all rights), Missouri (retains all rights), Montana (retains all rights), New Hampshire (may limit
guardianship), New Mexico (retains all rights), North Carolina (determines rights removed), Ohio (may limit
guardianship), Oregon (retains all rights), Pennsylvania (limited retains all rights), Rhode Island (limited retains
all rights), South Carolina (may limit guardianship), South Dakota (retains all rights), Tennessee (may limit),
Texas (retains all rights), Utah (retains all rights), and Vermont (limited ward retains all rights).
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right to have the guardianship court make a determination of the individual's
voting capacity.
That number is increased by provisions in the guardianship statutes or case
law that specifically articulate a requirement to determine capacity to vote.'
24
" Alaska, in addition to providing that a ward retains all legal and civil
rights except those expressly limited, specifically requires guardians
to assure that their wards enjoy all personal, civil, and human rights,
including the provision that they may not prohibit their wards from
registering to vote or from casting a ballot.
25
• Montana law specifically states, "[n]o incapacitated person may be
limited in the exercise of any civil or political rights except those that
are clearly inconsistent with the exercise of the powers granted to the
guardian unless the court's order specifically provides for such
limitations.' 26
" In Washington, the imposition of a guardianship does not result in
the loss of the right to vote unless the court determines that the
person is incompetent for purposes of rationally exercising the
franchise in that the individual lacks the capacity to understand the
nature and effect of voting such that she or he cannot make an
individual choice. The court order establishing guardianship shall
specify whether or not the individual retains voting rights. When a
court determines that the person is incompetent for the purpose of
rationally exercising the right to vote, the court shall notify the
appropriate county auditor.'
27
* Florida guardianship law requires judges to determine which of
several enumerated rights may be removed, including specifically the
right to vote.1
28
* If an Iowa court appoints a guardian, it must make a separate
determination as to the competency to vote. It may find the person
under guardianship incompetent to vote only if it determines "that
the person lacks sufficient mental capacity to comprehend and
exercise the right to vote."' 2 9
124. See Appendix B, col. G.
125. ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.26.090, 13.26.150(c)(4), 13.26.150(e)(6) (2006).
126. MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-5-316(3) (2005). Note that the guardian's powers could never include the
personal right of the ward to vote.
127. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.88.010(5) (West 2006).
128. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.3215(2)(b) (West 2005 & Supp. 2007).
129. IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.556 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007).
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* Under Minnesota law, the ward retains the right to vote unless the
court orders otherwise.'
30
* Wisconsin guardianship law requires the court to make a specific
finding as to which legal rights the person is competent to exercise,
including the right to vote."3
" The New Jersey decision in Carroll v. Cobb requires an
individualized inquiry to determine whether the incapacitated person
retains the right to vote.' 32 A constitutional amendment removing
idiot or insane person language and substituting a specific
adjudication of capacity to understand the act of voting will be
offered for ratification in November 2007.
" North Dakota has a specific provision in its guardianship laws that
no ward may be deprived of the legal right to vote, except upon
specific finding of the court.
1 3
" Connecticut law allows the guardian or conservator to petition the
probate court to determine a ward's competency to vote. The court
must hold a privileged hearing within fifteen days. 1
4
" Oklahoma's election laws specify that a person who has been
adjudged an incapacitated person is ineligible to register to vote.
However, any person who is adjudged to be partially incapacitated is
not prohibited from registration unless the order restricts such person
130. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.5-313(c)(8) (West Supp. 2007).
131. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 54.25(2)(c)l (West Supp. 2006). This provision is noteworthy as the most
recent legislative enactment regarding the rights of a person under guardianship. Enacted in 2005, the
legislature identified the right to vote as one of seven personal rights that can be removed, including the right to
consent to marriage, to execute a will, to serve on a jury, to apply for an operator's license, to consent to
sterilization, and to consent to organ, tissue, or bone marrow donation. The standard the court is to apply is if
the "individual is incapable of understanding the objective of the elective process." Id. The statute also
establishes a separate procedure by which a municipality elector may petition the circuit court for a
determination that an individual is incapable of understanding the objective of the elective process and thereby
is ineligible to register or vote. No guardian need be appointed and the determination may be reviewed. Id.
132. Carroll v. Cobb, 354 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1976). See infra text accompanying notes 150-56.
133. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-28-04(3) (1999 & Supp. 2003).
134. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-703 (West 2004) ("The guardian or conservator of an individual may file
a petition in probate court to determine such individual's competency to vote in a primary, referendum or
election. The probate court shall hold a hearing on the petition not later than fifteen days after the filing of the
petition and the hearing shall be privileged with respect to assignment."). Prior to its enactment a probate court
held that it did not have jurisdiction to consider voting capacity for persons with mental retardation because it
only had jurisdiction over the rights of persons with psychiatric disabilities. The plenary guardian/sister of
Dorothy Beers, a mentally retarded resident of a group home who could neither read or write, sought to have the
probate court remove Ms. Beers, a registered voter, from the list of eligible voters. Although the probate court
could determine if a person with psychiatric disabilities should have the right to vote removed, it did not have
jurisdiction to deprive a person with mental retardation of such right. In re Dorothy Beers, (Conn. Prob. Ct.,
Feb. 17, 1998), discussed in Lawrence Berliner, In the Matter of Dorothy Beers: Connecticut Probate Courts'
Authority to Curtail the Right of Persons with Disabilities to Vote, 13 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 49 (1998).
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from being eligible to register to vote.'35 The Oklahoma guardianship
law further provides that the court may assign to the limited guardian
the duty to assist the ward in fulfilling his civic duties, which
impliedly includes the right and responsibility to vote.
13 6
In 2001, Arkansas changed its law concerning the presumption of an
incapacitated person's right to vote. A guardian appointed before that
date could not prohibit a ward from voting without filing a petition.'37
However, guardians appointed after October 1, 2001 may not allow a
ward to vote without filing a petition and receiving express court
approval authorizing the ward to vote.'38
" Although the right to vote is not specifically mentioned in
Maryland's guardianship law, it does state that the "[a]ppointment of
a guardian of the person: (1) [i]s not evidence of incompetency of the
disabled person; and (2) [d]oes not modify any civil right of the
disabled person unless the court orders, including any civil service
ranking, appointment, and rights relating to licensure, permit,
privilege, or benefit under any law.', 39 The right to vote could be, but
has not been, interpreted as a "privilege under any law."
" California's conservatorship law for incapacitated adults assigns the
county's Court Investigator the responsibility to recommend whether
the conservatee is capable of completing an affidavit of voter
registration at the initiation of the conservatorship and then at the
Court Investigator's annual or biennial review. If the court finds the
person is not capable of completing the affidavit, the elections
official must cancel the registration. If, during its review, the Court
Investigator recommends that the person has regained the capacity to
complete the affidavit, the court must hold a hearing. If the court
finds the person capable of voting, the right to register is restored.
The conservatee may contest any disqualification from voting and
can specifically petition for the restoration of voting privileges.'
4°
The Maine constitutional provision that prohibited registering and voting by
persons under guardianship for mental illness was held in Doe v. Rowe to be
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal
135. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 4-101 (West 1997 & Supp. 2007).
136. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 3-114 (West 1991).
137. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-302(a)(1)(E) (2004).
138. Id. § 28-65-302(a)(2)(E).
139. MD. CODE ANN. EST. & TRUSTS § 13-706(b) (LexisNexis 2001).
140. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5357(c), 5358.3 (West 1998 & Supp. 2007) (providing for a petition
to contest rights denied a conservatee, specifically including the right to vote); CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 2209-2210
(West 2003).
953
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Protection Clauses. The state constitution was found to be fatally deficient
because the persons subject to guardianship proceedings were "not specifically
advised that they could be disenfranchised if they [were] placed under full
guardianship" and that their capacity to vote was not specifically addressed
during guardianship proceedings.142 No proffered interpretation of the state
constitution or guardianship disenfranchising process allowed for the consistent
and specific finding of the individual's ability to vote. 143
Guardianship statutes are not the only place to look in state codes for
provisions relating to the right to vote by persons with cognitive impairments.
Four states' statutes specifically refer to the right to vote of persons with mental
illness or mental retardation. Every institutionalized, mentally-ill person in Idaho
has the right to vote unless that right has been limited by prior order.'
4
Louisiana's law warrants specific attention because of its effort to enable and
encourage persons with mental retardation to exercise their voting privileges. Its
election law voices
the policy of the state of Louisiana to encourage the full participation in
voting by all citizens of this state, including persons with mental
retardation who have not been declared to be mentally incompetent
pursuant to a full interdiction, or whose right to vote has not been
suspended by a limited interdiction, regardless of such person's living
arrangements, which include but shall not be limited to a group home,
institution, or treatment facility.'
45
The Department of Health and Hospitals is directed to "promulgate rules and
regulations . . . to insure that persons with mental retardation for whom the
department provides care and treatment.., are permitted to [register and vote] in
compliance with federal and state laws and regulations.' 46
Connecticut has similar provisions that encourage voting by persons with
mental retardation who are institutionalized in state facilities. It has a detailed
election process that encourages voting opportunities for persons in mental health
institutions, residential facilities for the mentally retarded, or community
residences, 147 as well as supervised absentee voting in an inclusive list of
141. Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D. Me. 2001). The disenfranchisement process also violated the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134 and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Pub. L.
No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
142. Doe, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 43.
143. Id. at 51, 56.
144. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-346(a)(6) (2007) ("Every patient shall have the following rights: ... [t]o
exercise all civil rights, including the right to dispose of property .... execute instruments, make purchases,
enter into contractual relationships, and vote unless limited by prior court order ... .
145. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:102.1.A (2004 & Supp. 2007).
146. Id. § 18:102.1.B.
147. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-159q to 159s (West 2002 & Supp. 2007).
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institutions. 4 8 The facility administrators must use their best efforts to give
written notice to guardians and conservators that their wards have voting
opportunities, unless a court has determined that the resident is incompetent to
vote, or unless "registrars ...conclude at a supervised voting session that the
resident declines to vote . . . or they are unable to determine how the resident
desires to vote."'
49
New Jersey has recently amended its mental health law to indicate that no
patient should be deprived of any civil right by reason of treatment, including the
right to register or vote.5° Prior to the 2006 election, the Public Advocate sent a
letter to all New Jersey voters with a disability, advising them that the "right to
vote is protected by the laws of the United States and the State of New Jersey....
[and] to make sure that voters with disabilities in [New Jersey] know about their
right to vote in person at the polls on Election Day."' 5 ' The letter continued, "[b]y
law, voters with disabilities have the same legal right to vote as everyone else."'
5 2
It explained that a person cannot be denied the right to vote because they have a
certain type of disability, because they have a legal guardian, or because they live
in an "institution, group home, supported apartment, or other residential facility
that serves people with disabilities."' 53 In bold and underlined print, the letter
states, "[O]nly a judge can stop a person from voting because of a disability."'154 It
explains that
[t]he judge must first hear evidence from a doctor or other expert that
proves that the person is not able to understand what voting is and cannot
form an opinion about the choices on the ballot. This does not mean that
a person with a disability has to prove that he or she understands how
government works or has a good reason for voting a certain way. A voter
with a disability may not be asked those types of questions.'
5
The letter concludes by recommending that the voter take the letter to the polls
"in case any questions arise" and provides a phone number to call if the voter has
any problems on Election Day. ,-6
148. Id. § 9-159q(l) ("'Institution' means a veterans' health care facility, residential care home, health
care facility for the handicapped, nursing home, rest home, mental health facility, alcohol or drug treatment
facility, an infirmary operated by an educational institution for the care of its students, faculty and employees or
an assisted living facility ... .
149. Id. § 9-159s(b).
150. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.2(a) (West 1997).
151. Letter from Ronald K. Chen, Public Advocate, N.J. Dep't of the Pub. Advocate, to N.J. Voters with
Disabilities (Sept. 29, 2006), http://www.state.nj.us/publicadvocate/reports/pdfs/Letter-toP'D-onvoting-
2006.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. (emphasis omitted).
155. Id. (emphasis omitted).
156. Id. In the November 2007 elections, New Jersey voters will have the opportunity to ratify a
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Although not found within either the guardianship code or the mental health
laws, Delaware's election laws require "a specific finding in a judicial
guardianship . . . proceeding, based on clear and convincing evidence that the
individual has a severe cognitive impairment which precludes [the] exercise of
basic voting judgment."'57
The Massachusetts Secretary of State has issued an opinion that although
according to the constitution and election laws persons "under guardianship" are
not eligible to vote, only those persons whose guardianship specifically addresses
incompetence to vote cannot vote.
18
Cross Analysis of the Right to Determination of Voting Capacity. When
guardianship codes and other provisions specifically concerning voting are
examined, a clear majority of the states could enable persons who are
incapacitated in their ability to make their own decisions regarding their financial
or personal affairs to retain the right to vote. This could happen in those states
with two provisos: the court must give broad effect to guardianship provisions
limiting the deprivation of right and the court must make a specific determination
concerning capacity to vote. When all provisions regarding voting by persons
with cognitive impairments are examined, states fall into three groupings: 1)
thirty-two states with a specific right to have the court determine capacity to vote
or no constitutional bar to voting by reason of mental impairment,"9 2) twelve
jurisdictions with an implied right to such a determination,' 6° and 3) seven states
that categorically restrict the right to vote for persons with cognitive
impairments. 161
The "implied" right to vote states are those where there is a difference in
terminology between the constitution, election laws, and guardianship provisions
defining incapacity. 62 Also included are those states that prefer or require limited
guardianship and where wards retain rights except those specifically removed.
The analysis that is set out in Appendix B considers whether the terminology
used in constitutions or election laws is equivalent to that used in guardianship
codes and could be interpreted to exclude from voting a different category of
persons. Applying typical statutory construction, a person found to be
"incapacitated" under guardianship law is not necessarily a person who is
constitutional amendment requiring a specific judicial determination of capacity to understand the act of voting.
157. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 1701 (1999 & Supp. 2006).
158. Opinion of the [Massachusetts] Elections Division reprinted in JOHN. H. CROSS ET AL.,
GUARDIANSHIP AND CONSERVATORSHIP IN MASSACHUSETTS 149 (2000) (on file with authors).
159. Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin.
160. Alabama, District of Columbia, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Nebraska, New Mexico, New
York, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, and Utah.
161. Arizona, Hawaii, Mississippi, Nevada, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
162. Compare Appendix B, cols. B, C, & D.
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mentally incompetent to vote. Additionally, applying the constitutional reasoning
of Doe v. Rowe, a general bar by reason of mental incompetence must be aug-
mented by a specific judicial finding of the individual's inability to understand
the nature and effect of voting.'63
VI. COURT DETERMINATION
A court, rather than an election official, must make the determination of
whether an individual has the capacity to vote. In Carroll v. Cobb, a New Jersey
court has specifically found that such determinations are outside of the authority
or ability of election officials.' 64 In most cases, the determination will be made in
the context of a guardianship proceeding.'65 Wisconsin appears to be the only
state that has established a specific judicial procedure for an election official to
challenge a voter's capacity to vote. 66 Although guardianship laws define who is
incapacitated and in need of a guardian, 67 few states give specific guidance to
their courts as to how to determine if a person does not have the capacity to vote.
Only four states give specific statutory direction as to what a judge is to
consider when determining whether a person is ineligible to vote. In Delaware,
the standard is clear and convincing evidence of "severe cognitive impairment
which precludes exercise of basic voting judgment.' ' 6' An Iowa court may find
that a person is incompetent to vote only upon determining that the individual
"lacks sufficient mental capacity to comprehend and exercise the right to vote.',
169
In Washington, the court must determine "that the person is incompetent for
purposes of rationally exercising the franchise in that the individual lacks the
capacity to understand the nature and effect of voting such that she or he cannot
163. See Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D. Me. 2001).
164. 354 A.2d 355 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976). During the 1853 debate at the Massachusetts
constitutional convention over whether to use the words "idiot or insane person" or "person under
guardianship," one of the delegates raised the concern that the solemn adjudication by a competent tribunal was
the only criterion to settle the question of insanity or idiocy. He distrusted the ability of selectmen to make a
proper determination "because they might believe a person to be idiotic or insane who was not so." Schriner &
Ochs, supra note 50, at 525-26.
165. When an election result is challenged on the basis that specific individuals were disqualified from
voting because of their mental capacity, a court of general jurisdiction would hear the challenge. Whether the
court also has guardianship jurisdiction depends on state court jurisdiction provisions. See, e.g., Carroll v. Cobb,
354 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1976) (election challenge heard in the Law Division, not in the court that would determine
guardianship); Town of Lafayette v. City of Chippewa, 235 N.W.2d 435 (Wis. 1975) (Circuit Court interpreted
guardianship law in context of annexation challenge); New v. Corrough, 370 S.W.2d 323 (Mo. 1963) (Circuit
Court considered whether residents of a private nursing home were residents of a county-funded poor house).
166. A municipal elector may petition the court in a specific proceeding to determine capacity to vote
that does not involve the appointment of a guardian. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 54.25(2)(c)1.g (West Supp. 2006).
167. See Appendix B, col. D.
168. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 1701 (1999 & Supp. 2006).
169. IOWA CODEANN. § 633.556(1) (West 2003 & Supp. 2007).
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make an individual choice."'' 0 The Wisconsin court must find that the person "is
incapable of understanding the objective of the elective process. '
The standards used by courts to determine incapacity to manage personal or
financial matters may not coincide with the criteria for voting competency. The
Ohio Constitution disqualifies those who are "idiots" or "insane" persons. 72 In a
case involving a person who was not under guardianship, the court defined the
term "idiot" as a person who has "suffered such a deprivation of reason that he is
no longer capable of understanding and acting with discretion and judgment in
the ordinary affairs of life" and "insane person" as one "who has been without
understanding from his nativity.' 73 By contrast, the Ohio definition of an
"incompetent person" in a guardianship proceeding is
any person who is so mentally impaired as a result of a mental or
physical illness or disability, or mental retardation, or as a result of
chronic substance abuse, that the person is incapable of taking proper
care of the person's self or property or fails to provide for the person's
family or other persons for whom the person is charged by law to
provide, or any person confined to a correctional institution within [the]
state. '
This comparison of terminology raises the question whether an Ohioan's ability
to vote would be determined using different criteria depending on whether the
case was brought as part of a guardianship proceeding (whether incompetent) or
a challenge to elector status (whether insane).
The pending case of Missouri Protection and Advocacy, Inc. v. Carnahan
illustrates the complexities created by the differing criteria for the appointment of
a guardian and the due process conundrums raised by classifying a person
incompetent to vote without any specific judicial consideration. The case was
originally brought by Steven Prye, a former law professor at the University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, who was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder
and placed under a full Illinois guardianship with the Office of State Guardian.
76
He was found in need of a guardian because he was unable to dress, maintain
170. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.88.010(5) (West 2006).
171. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 54.25(2)(c)1.g (West Supp. 2006). The new statutory language tracks the
standard previously adopted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. See Town of Lafayette v. City of Chippewa
Falls, 235 N.W.2d 435, 441 (Wis. 1975) (holding that "persons who are mentally incapable of knowing or
understanding the nature and objective of the elective question should not be eligible to vote").
172. See OHIO CONST. art. V, § 6.
173. Baker v. Keller, 237 N.E.2d 629, 638 (Ct. Com. P1. Ohio 1968).
174. OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2111.01(D) (LexisNexis 2002).
175. Mo. Prot. & Advocacy Servs., Inc. v. Carnahan, No. 06-3014 (8th Cir. 2007), on appeal sub. nom.
from Prye v. Carnahan, No. 04-4248-CV-C-ODS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46176 (W.D. Mo. July 7, 2004).
176. Anya Litvak, Lawsuit Challenges Missouri Voting Laws, MISSOURIAN (Columbia), Oct. 21, 2004
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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personal hygiene, or manage money.'7 7 Illinois does not bar persons under
guardianship from voting; thus, during the guardianship proceeding, no
determination was made of his ability to vote. 78 Under Illinois law, he suffered
no legal disability to vote. He then moved to Missouri and attempted to register
to vote. 79 He was denied that right because under Missouri law persons under
guardianship cannot vote."l Prye's motion for a preliminary injunction requiring
him to be allowed to register and to vote was denied on the basis that he had "the
opportunity to demonstrate that he retains the capacity to vote and is entitled to a
limited guardianship."' 8'1 He was given the options to pursue limitation of the
Illinois guardianship or "to argue that the petition for guardianship pending in
Missouri should be a limited guardianship"; either option, if successful, would
allow him to vote. 1
2
Subsequently, Professor Prye died. Secretary of State Matt Blunt became
governor and was replaced as named defendant by Robin Carnahan, the new
Missouri Secretary of State. The case proceeded on appeal with the Missouri
Protection and Advocacy agency as the organizational plaintiff, representing its
constituents who were under full guardianship and had never had their capacity
to vote adjudicated in Missouri. The new plaintiffs argued that although the
guardianship proceeding was aimed at determining if an individual was
"incapacitated" because of an inability to manage money or attend to physical
needs, these impairments did not necessarily have any relation to the ability or
capacity to vote. Nevertheless, a finding that the person is incapacitated
automatically triggers the Missouri voting ban.
Co-author Dr. Paul S. Appelbaum evaluated specific constituents of the
appellant Missouri Protection and Advocacy agency and concluded that they had
the capacity to vote despite being under full guardianship. According to his
expert testimony, they were "typical of a substantial group of persons under
guardianship in every state, who whatever their other functional limitations
remain competent to vote."' 83 Appellants also noted that "Public Administrators
177. Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 1, Prye v. Blunt, No. 04-4248-CV-
C-ODS, (W.D. Mo. Oct. 26, 2004), http://www.uphs.upenn.edu/adc/old-site/news/Prye%20v%20Missouri%
20case%20denial%20of%20voting%20rights.pdf [hereinafter Order Denying Preliminary Injunction] (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
178. Id. at5.
179. Id. at 2.
180. "No person who has a guardian of his or her estate or person by reason of mental incapacity,
appointed by a court ... shall be entitled to vote ...." Mo. CONST. art. VIII, § 2. By statute, persons "adjudged
incapacitated" cannot vote. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 115.133.2 (West 1997 & Supp. 2007). An adjudication of full
incapacity imposes legal disabilities provided by law. Id. § 475.078.2. A person adjudicated partially
incapacitated or disabled is presumed competent and the adjudication imposes no legal disabilities. Id. §
475.078.1.
181. Order Denying Preliminary Injunction, supra note 177, at 7.
182. Id. at 8.
183. Opening Brief of the Plaintiffs-Appellants at 11, Mo. Prot. & Advocacy Servs., Inc., v. Carnahan,
No. 06-3014 (8th Cir. Sept. 28, 2006), https://www.wulaw.wustl.edu/news/documents/OpeningBr.pdf (last
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of four separate counties testified that the subject of voting rarely, if ever, is
raised in guardianship hearings, even though a guardianship order results in
disenfranchisement."'84 The court additionally heard testimony about the
"extensive barriers that stand in the way of wards [under full guardianship]
seeking restoration of their voting rights."'85
In granting summary judgment to the state on constitutional due process and
equal protection claims, as well as claimed violations of the Americans with
Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, the district court reasoned that
individuals under full guardianship can retain the right to vote if they persuade a
probate court that they are not incapacitated with respect to their ability to vote.
Despite constitutional and statutory language indicating that a person under a full
order of protection is presumed incompetent and cannot vote, as long as
"Missouri affords an individualized determination of a person's abilities and
limitations and denies the right to vote to those who lack the mental capacity to
exercise that right," the scheme sufficiently differentiates between those who
should and should not vote.8 6 The Eighth Circuit, with retired Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor sitting by designation, heard oral arguments on February 12, 2007, as
this article was being finalized.
VII. ASSESSING CAPACITY TO VOTE
Defining a Standard. As the preceding discussion makes clear, even in the
face of a presumption that persons are competent to vote, it will at least
sometimes be necessary to assess directly their capacity to do so. This was not
always the case, since the older constitutional provisions, statutes, and case law
tended to define incapacity by status (e.g., whether a person was under
guardianship, had been committed to a mental facility, or was insane) rather than
by functional ability.' 87 Although such language remains in some states'
constitutions and statutes, most jurisdictions with explicit language have moved
to a functional standard, which requires an individualized determination of a
person's abilities to vote, rather than relying on some other aspect of their legal
or medical status. 8  At a minimum, and least controversially, these individualized
assessments may occur in guardianship proceedings under those statutes that
either require or permit judicial determinations of whether an alleged
incompetent person should retain the right to vote. Discussed below is the more
difficult question of whether such determinations may be acceptable at other
visited July 6, 2007) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
184. Id. at 12-13.
185. Id. at 14.
186. Prye v. Carnahan, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46176, No. 04-4248-CV-C-ODS, at *20 (W.D. Mo. July
7, 2006).
187. See supra notes 18-27 and accompanying text.
188. See generally supra Part III.
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locations in which decisions about access to the polls may be made-de jure or
defacto-such as at registration or voting sites, or in long-term care facilities.
Given the references to the voting rights of persons under guardianship in
statutory and case law requiring some sort of individualized determination of
voting capacity, it might be expected that the criteria for capacity to vote by now
would be consensually agreed to and clearly defined. However, as should be
clear from the review above of the law on voting by persons with mental
impairments, relatively little attention has been given in most jurisdictions to
considering by what standard a person's voting capacity should be determined.
Of the four states whose statutes attempt to define a standard, two definitions are
essentially circular and hence of limited use to assessors, judicial or otherwise:
Delaware's "severe cognitive impairment which precludes exercise of basic
voting judgment"'8 9 and Iowa's "lacks sufficient mental capacity to comprehend
and exercise the right to vote."' 9°
Some assistance in the definition of a standard, though, can be obtained from
the Washington and Wisconsin statutes, which echo each other in helpful ways.
Washington characterizes incompetence to vote as "lack[ing] the capacity to
understand the nature and effect of voting such that she or he cannot make an
individual choice"; 9' Wisconsin similarly looks to whether the person is
"incapable of understanding the objective of the elective process. ' '9' What they
have in common is a focus on a person's ability to understand something of what
voting and the electoral process entail, i.e., their "nature and effect" or
"objective." Washington adds the requirement that the person be able to make an
"individual choice," an addition of questionable impact, since a potential voter
who cannot make a choice is not likely to cast a ballot, rendering moot the
assessment of their capacity to vote.
This focus in formulating a standard for voting capacity on understanding the
nature of voting has been reflected in the sparse case law on this question as well.
An early twentieth-century Illinois case, Welch v. Shumway, rejected a challenge
to the competence with which a ballot was cast because the voter understood the
nature of his act and had interacted in a rational fashion with persons at the
polling site. 93 More recently, when the Maine Federal District Court in Doe v.
Rowe struck down the state's constitutional provision that automatically
disenfranchised persons under guardianship by reason of mental illness, it
adopted a functional standard identical to that found in the Washington statute,
again underscoring the importance of the ability to understand the nature and
purpose of casting a ballot.' 94
189. DEL. CODEANN. tit.15, § 1701 (1999 & Supp. 2006).
190. IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.556 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007).
191. WASH. REV. CODEANN. § 11.88.010(5) (West 2006 & Supp. 2007).
192. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 54.25(2)(c)1.g (West Supp. 2006).
193. 83 N.E. 549, 558 (I11. 907).
194. 156 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D. Me. 2001).
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Although neither the case law nor the statutes are particularly informative
with regard to the policy considerations that may have entered into the selection
of a functional standard for capacity to vote, an attempt to situate the Washington
State/Doe standard in the broader context of tests of capacity may clarify some of
the considerations here. Two preliminary points should be underscored. First, the
definition of the criteria for capacity is an exercise in policy, not science.' 95
Second, persons' capacities for most tasks range along a spectrum from greater to
lesser proficiency. There is no scientifically determinable point on that spectrum
at which we can say that the person manifests sufficient capacity for the task.
How much capacity we require for any given task reflects the weight we give to
the importance of allowing persons to perform the task even in the face of some
degree of impairment, tallied against the weight of concerns regarding the
possible adverse outcomes of the task if performed by someone whose capacity
may be impaired.9 6 Essentially, this is a determination regarding allocation of the
risk of error. A relatively low standard for capacity allows more people to
perform the task in question but increases the risk that persons with some
significant degree of impairment will do so in a less-than-optimal fashion. In
contrast, a high standard for capacity restricts the number of people who can
perform the task, offering greater assurance that those who exceed the required
threshold are capable of performing the task adequately, but heightening the risk
that some persons capable of carrying out the task will not be permitted to do so.
In resolving these conflicting policy considerations, it also must be
recognized that capacities for legal purposes generally fall into two categories:
the capacity to decide something and the capacity to do something. Examples of
decisional capacities include the capacities to decide about medical treatment,
enter into a contract, write a will, and marry. Decisional capacities such as these
rest on an essentially cognitive foundation, i.e., each requires a person to grasp
enough of the relevant data so as to be able to consider at least two options (and
often many more) and to arrive at a choice that he or she favors. In contrast,
examples of capacities to do something include the capacities to drive an
automobile, parent a child, and stand trial for a criminal offense. Like decisional
capacities, these performance-oriented capacities incorporate a cognitive
component; indeed, most require not one but a sequence of decisions to be made.
However, they also require physical actions or behaviors that are essential to the
task at hand. For example, a person who is cognizant of relevant traffic laws and
appreciates the need for caution on the road may nonetheless be said to lack
capacity to drive if he or she has such impaired visual acuity as to be unable to
see oncoming traffic or, as the consequence of a stroke, cannot turn the steering
wheel or step on the brake. The capacity to vote is a decisional capacity. That is,
195. See PAUL S. APPELBAUM & THOMAS G. GUTHEIL, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY & THE
LAW 183-84 (4th ed. 2007).
196. THOMAS GRISSO & PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ASSESSING COMPETENCE TO CONSENT TO TREATMENT
127-40 (1998).
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although there is a physical aspect to casting a ballot (e.g., flipping a lever,
completing a paper form, or touching a computer screen), it is not an intrinsic
part of the voting process that must be accomplished by the voter himself or
herself. So long as a decision about voting can be made and communicated,
someone else can carry out the necessary physical acts to ensure that a ballot is
cast.
So the drafters of state constitutions, the authors of legislation, and the
crafters of judicial opinions are making what is inescapably a policy decision
about a decisional capacity when they attempt to define an appropriate standard
for the capacity to vote. In this context, they are not writing on a clean slate.
Decisional capacities have been the subject of a great deal of legislation, case
law, and commentary, and a rough consensus has evolved on the usual
framework of decisional capacity criteria.' 97 Typically, standards for decisional
capacities incorporate one or more of the following elements, requiring a person
to have the ability to: understand the information relevant to the decision to be
made, appreciate the implications of that information for his or her own
situation, reason about the information in a manner that compares the options,
and choose the desired option from the list of possibilities.'98 As more of these
elements are added to a compound standard of capacity, the test becomes more
rigorous. 9  The threshold can also be raised by requiring more information to be
understood, appreciated, and reasoned with. Thus, policymakers have a good deal
of latitude in crafting decisional capacity standards based on the previously noted
considerations of whether to encourage free exercise of the decisional right in
question or to protect the allegedly impaired person or others from the
consequences of a less-than-optimal decisional process.
How do these considerations apply to the issue of capacity to vote? As
described in other contributions to this Symposium, the right to vote is a basic,
inalienable right of citizenship, albeit one that has not always been widely
extended in the United States. 00 Indeed, at present, the right to vote could be said
to be the defining characteristic of a democratic polity. Hence, there would
appear to be strong reasons to allow persons to exercise the franchise except in
the clearest cases of substantial incapacity to do so. Moreover, the countervailing
considerations are weaker here than in the case of many other decisional
capacities. Should an incompetent individual be allowed to cast a ballot by virtue
of an unduly lax standard, the harm to that person is minimal and indirect. If the
person's choice is different than what he or she would competently have chosen,
197. Jessica Wilen Berg et al., Constructing Competence: Formulating Standards of Legal Competence
to Make Medical Decisions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 345, 348-62 (1996).
198. Id.
199. See, e.g., Thomas Grisso & Paul Appelbaum, Comparison of Standards for Assessing Patients'
Capacities to Make Treatment Decisions, 152 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1033 (1995).
200. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE
UNITED STATES 316-24 (2000).
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there might be said to be an intangible injury to his or her broader interests in
exercising an authentic, autonomous choice. But it is more difficult to identify
potential concrete harms to the polity. A single incompetently cast ballot is not
likely to affect the course of an election, and even a larger number of such
ballots, assuming that the errors they reflect are distributed randomly, are
unlikely to have a substantial impact. 20 ' Hence, even if the well-being of the
person casting an incompetent vote would be better served by the candidate for
whom he or she would have voted if competent, but by virtue of incompetence
did not, the likelihood that the incompetently cast ballot will affect the outcome
of the election, and thus harm the person in a material way, is slight.
If this is the case, it might be asked whether there is any substantial
counterbalance at all to the interest of persons in voting, sufficient to justify
denying anyone who desires to vote access to the ballot box on the grounds of
incompetence, at least so long as there is the attendant possibility of error in
excluding a potentially competent voter. Why, in other words, is there a state
interest in ensuring that voters are competent to vote? The ubiquity and long
presence of provisions excluding persons believed to be incompetent from
exercising the franchise suggest that policymakers have been able to identify
reasons for such a requirement. Indeed, even in the absence of concrete harm to
incompetent voters or a likely impact on the outcome of an election, the state
would appear to have an interest in protecting the perception of the integrity of
the voting process. Were the voting public to perceive that incompetent persons
routinely cast ballots, the seriousness with which competent voters approach the
process of selecting candidates and issues for their support might be diminished.
Why is it worth spending time analyzing the choices on the ballot, a competent
voter might ask, when the state is willing to allow even clearly incompetent
people to participate in what one might conclude is not a terribly important
process? In addition, although small, the possibility cannot be excluded that
incompetently cast ballots could affect the outcome of close elections, especially
at local levels, where the pool of voters is restricted.202 Moreover, if incompetent
voters are susceptible to systematic manipulation of their votes, which may be
the case when they live in congregate facilities, the state has an added incentive
to exclude them from the list of eligible voters.
Given a rationale for excluding some clearly incompetent persons from
voting, it seems evident that the standards identified in those jurisdictions that
have provided specific guidance on the question are intended to set a relatively
low threshold for capacity to vote and to maximize the number of persons who
are eligible to cast a ballot. The emphasis on understanding the nature and effect
201. See Roy, supra note 8, at 117-18.
202. See, e.g., John Stromnes, Provisional Vote May Swing Election, BILLINGSGAZETrE.COM, Nov. 8,
2004, http://www.billingsgazette.net/articles/2004/11/08/state/exportl80410.txt (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review); Democrats' Handling of Election Protest Draws Fire, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Aug. 8,
2004, at B3.
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of voting and on making a choice, as seen in Washington State's statute, °3 the
decision in Doe v. Rowe,2°4 and similar sources, is clearly intended to constitute a
minimal impediment to access to the polls. Compare, for example, the usual
standards applied to medical treatment decision-making, which require
substantial abilities to understand, appreciate, reason, and choose.2 5 Taken
together, these criteria represent a relatively rigorous standard, which appears to
have evolved from concerns that lesser standards would allow patients with
considerable decisional impairment to make medical treatment decisions that
would not be in their best interests (e.g., refusing highly beneficial medical
treatment). Indeed, the rigor of this four-part standard is increased further in
practice by requiring higher cut-offs on each ability when the risks associated
with the patient's putative choice are substantial. 0 6
In contrast, there is general agreement in the context of voting that the risks
associated with allowing marginally incapable voters of casting a ballot are
small, and the harms of excluding persons who might in fact be capable are
substantial. Thus, there is every reason to whittle down the required abilities to a
bare minimum, as evidenced by the Washington State/Doe standard. By
excluding appreciation and reasoning components, voting competence standards
eliminate two possible tests of decisional abilities that would likely increase the
rigor of the standard; data from studies of competence in decision-making for
medical purposes demonstrate that each component added to a capacity standard
identifies some non-overlapping portion of subjects as impaired. 0 7 In contrast,
the modest abilities required by the Washington State/Doe standard make it less
likely that potential voters will be denied access to the polls. Moreover, the
information that must be understood under the Washington State/Doe and similar
standards does not relate to specific candidates or issues in a particular election
but to the general nature of casting a ballot and the consequence of doing so.
Thus, even in retaining the understanding standard, those legislatures and courts
that have spoken to this issue require only a modicum of knowledge about voting
in general and disallow a particularized inquiry into the specifics of a given
election.
The majority of jurisdictions currently lack clear law, either statutory or case
law, defining their standards for capacity to vote; hence, anticipating how those
standards may evolve in the future is necessarily speculative. However, the
policy considerations that motivate the adoption of a low-threshold standard for
capacity to vote would appear to be generally applicable. It would not be
surprising if the decision in Doe v. Rowe and the Washington State standard
203. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.88.010(5) (West 2006).
204. Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D. Me. 2001).
205. GRISSO & APPELBAUM, supra note 196, at 31-58.
206. ALLEN E. BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS: THE ETHICS OF SURROGATE
DECISION MAKING 51-57 (1989).
207. GRISSO & APPELBAUM, supra note 196.
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came to be reflected more broadly in case law and, as revisions occur, in statutes
as well. Thus, it is worthwhile to consider how this standard-and by extension
other standards of voting capacity-can be operationalized for the purpose of
determining whether a particular voter meets the necessary criteria.
Operationalizing a Standard. Standardized assessment of decisional
capacities has developed rapidly since roughly 1990, with a proliferation of
reliable and validated assessment instruments for decisions ranging from
selecting medical treatment to managing one's financial affairs."' The results of
these assessments are usually displayed as quantitative scores on one or more
scales that reflect the degree of capacity of the subject. Viewed properly, these
instruments are best seen as tools that generate data to be taken into account by
an assessor rather than as determinants in their own right of a person's
competence or incompetence. That is, although cut-off scores may be set, below
which further careful evaluation might be indicated, the instrument itself should
not yield a yes/no judgment on a person's competence. A decision to abrogate the
right to make one's own decisions is sufficiently weighty that there should be an
opportunity for an evaluator to take into account considerations that may modify
or negate the findings of a structured assessment instrument. Nonetheless, it can
be of obvious use to a decision-maker, especially in close cases, to know whether
a particular person scores in the range usually associated with capacity or
209incapacity.
Relying on the standard enunciated in Doe v. Rowe for guidance, an
instrument called the Competence Assessment Tool for Voting, or CAT-V, has
208. See generally THOMAS GRisso, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND
INSTRUMENTS (2d ed. 2003) (on file with authors).
209. Recommendations, supra note 7. The standard embodied in the Recommendations of the
conference that engendered this Symposium, appearing elsewhere in this issue, might appear on its face to take
a different approach to defining what constitutes capacity to vote. A person is considered to have capacity,
according to the Recommendations, so long as he or she "expresses a specific desire to participate in the voting
process." Given that formulation, it might be supposed that any person who responds affirmatively to a query as
to whether the person wants to vote will be considered to have the capacity to do so. However, understood in
that way, no meaningful capacity requirement would have been established. For example, under such an
approach, a person with dementia who reflexively responded "Yes" to any question that was asked, even
without understanding its content (sadly, not an unusual phenomenon among persons with Alzheimer's disease
and other types of dementia), would be judged to have capacity to vote, though the person might believe that
touching the computer screen at the polling place was a means of ordering dinner.
Closer inspection of the language of the Recommendations suggests a more reasonable interpretation, and
one that the authors believe reflects the intent of its drafters. A "specific desire to participate in the voting
process" (emphasis added) indicates that something more than a random affirmative response is required. To
have a specific desire to participate in a process implies knowledge of the nature and purpose of the process, as
well as an intentional choice to participate. Under this interpretation, a competent voter would need to have
some modicum of understanding that by expressing his/her preferences, the voter is helping to select (but not
definitively determining) the president, governor, mayor, legislators, or other governing officials. This more
natural interpretation of the recommendation, which bears a strong resemblance to the Washington State/Doe
standard (though the two standards may not be identical), retains for the capacity criterion a role in ensuring that
voters are playing a meaningful part in the electoral process. It also suggests a standard that can be
operationalized in a manner that would allow reliable determination of voting capacity.
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been developed and tested.2 0 The core sections of the CAT-V pose tasks to
subjects designed to probe their understanding of the nature and effect of voting
and their ability to choose among candidates." The script for the introduction to
the assessment is structured as follows:
I'm going to ask you some questions about elections. This should take
about five minutes. If you don't understand something I say or ask,
please tell me and I will repeat it. Some of the questions may seem very
simple to you, but don't worry about that. We are just looking for
straightforward answers. Do you have any questions before we begin?
212
Once any questions are answered, subjects' understanding of the nature of
voting is then probed.
"Imagine that two candidates are running for Governor of [subject's
state], and that today is Election Day in [subject's state]. What will the
people of [subject's state] do today to pick the next Governor?" [Note to
interviewer: If subject describes how he/she or people in general would
choose between the two choices for governor (i.e., watch TV ads, listen
to their campaign issues, etc.), ask: "Well that's how you might decide
who you think should be governor. But how would you actually indicate
your choice?,
21 3
Responses to this question are scored in the following fashion:
Score of 2: completely correct response, e.g., "They will go to the polls
and vote." "Each person will cast his/her vote for one or the other."
Score of 1: Ambiguous or partially correct response, e.g., "That's why
we have Election Day." Score of 0: Incorrect or irrelevant response, e.g.,
"There's nothing you can do; the TV guy decides."
214
The interviewer and subject then move to assessment of the subject's
understanding of the effect of voting.
210. See Paul Appelbaum et al., The Capacity to Vote of Persons with Alzheimer's Disease, 162 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 2094 (2005). The description of the CAT-V study in this section is drawn from this article.
211. The initial version of the CAT-V also included sections on Appreciation and Reasoning that were
included solely for research purposes. These abilities are not encompassed by the Washington State/Doe
standard, and hence are not included here. As expected, when operationalized in the study described below,
these additional criteria identified a larger number of subjects as potentially impaired.
212. Appelbaum et al., supra note 210, at 2099 app. I.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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"When the election for governor is over, how will it be decided who the
winner is?"
215
Scoring is as follows:
Score of 2: Completely correct response, e.g., "The votes will be counted
and the person with more votes will be the winner." Score of 1:
Ambiguous or partially correct response, e.g., "By the numbers." Score
of 0: Incorrect or irrelevant response, e.g., "It all depends on which sign
they were born under." [Note to interviewer: it is likely that some
subjects will answer both of these questions in response to the first
question. If so, they should be given a full score for each, and the second
question may be omitted.]
2 16
Finally, the subject's ability to choose among the candidates is explored. The
subject is handed a card with the information in the following paragraph in large
print and is allowed to retain and consult this card for the remainder of the
interview.
Let me ask you to imagine the following about the two candidates who
are running. Candidate A thinks the state should be doing more to
provide health insurance to people who don't have it, and should be
spending more money on schools. He is willing to raise taxes to get the
money to do these things. Candidate B says the government should not
provide health insurance but should make it easier for employers to offer
it. He believes that the schools have enough money already but need
tighter controls to make sure they use it properly. He is against raising
taxes.217
The subject is then asked:
Based on what I just told you, which candidate do you think you are
more likely to vote for: A or B?" . . . If subject cannot choose a candidate
or is vacillating, [he or she is] ask[ed]: "If you had to make a choice
based on the information you have before you, who would you pick?"2 '8
Responses are scored:
Score of 2: Clearly indicates choice. Score of 1: Choice is ambiguous or
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but I'm not sure because schools are important too." Score of 0: No
choice is stated, e.g., "I don't know. I can never make up my mind. '" 9
Subjects' scores from the three questions are cumulated for a total CAT-V
score that ranges from 0-6.
In an initial test of the instrument, the CAT-V was administered to thirty-
three persons with Alzheimer's disease recruited from the Memory Disorders
Clinic at the University of Pennsylvania. If the caregiver (usually an adult child)
who accompanied the subject to the clinic agreed to the subject's participation in
an interview, the subject provided either verbal informed consent or assent (in
which case their caregiver provided verbal informed consent) after disclosure of
the nature of the study. The project was approved by the Institutional Review
Board at the University of Pennsylvania. Of the subjects, the severity of dementia
was very mild for five (fifteen percent), mild for eight (twenty-four percent),
moderate for eleven (thirty-three percent), and severe for nine (twenty-seven
percent), reflecting a wide range of severity, which is desirable in testing the
properties of a new assessment tool.22° The CAT-V items reported here took an
average of 3.6 minutes to administer, indicating the instrument could be used
efficiently for large-scale screening, and showed good interrater reliability, i.e.,
different raters scoring the same subjects had quite similar scores, a critical
determinant of whether an instrument is feasible for general use.
Table 1 below shows the distribution of scores on the CAT-V. Although few
subjects reflected impairment in choice (not unexpected in this group, since they
needed to be able to indicate a choice to participate in the study), close to half
failed to understand the nature of voting and roughly one-third could not
understand the effect of voting. Performance correlated strongly with the degree
of dementia affecting the subject: all persons with severe dementia scored a 2 or
lower on the CAT-V standard, and all persons with very mild and most with mild
dementia scored a 6. In contrast, persons with moderate stage dementia showed
substantial variability in their CAT-V scores, ranging from 2 to 6. Interestingly,
an expressed intention to vote in the next election was not a good predictor of
CAT-V scores; eight of the fourteen subjects who scored four or less (including
two of the three with scores of 0) expressed a desire to vote.
219. Id.
220. Categories were determined by standard scores on the most widely used measure of cognitive
impairment, the Mini Mental State Examination or MMSE. Id. at 2095.
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Table 1. Summary of CAT-V scores (n=33)
CAT-V item Score N (%)
o 15 (45%)
Understands the nature of voting 2 
18 (55%)
0 10 (30%)
Understands the effect of voting 1 3 (9%)
2 20 (61%)
0 4(12%)
Ability to make a choice 2 
2%)
2 29 (88%)
Although this study reports only an initial test of the CAT-V with a relatively
small sample of persons from a single clinic who were not selected randomly, the
results suggest that structured screening of elderly persons' capacities to vote can
be performed relatively efficiently and with very good reliability. Moreover, if
the tight correlation found here between CAT-V scores and degree of dementia is
replicated in larger-scale studies, it would suggest that assessment should be
targeted at those persons with moderate dementia; less severely afflicted persons
would almost certainly score well on the CAT-V, and more impaired persons
would score poorly.
Whatever its virtues, the CAT-V is by no means the only approach that could
be taken to structured assessment of capacity to vote. Some observers may differ
over the choice of questions or their wording. It has been noted that the current
version of the CAT-V focuses exclusively on elections for office, whereas voters
are often called on as well to make decisions about ballot referenda. Although it
seems likely that voters who meet the Washington/Doe standard with regard to
elections for public office will display similar abilities where referenda are
concerned, that correspondence remains to be demonstrated empirically.
Certainly one could imagine an expanded version of the CAT-V that explicitly
addressed both elections to office and referenda.
Using a structured interview like the CAT-V offers advantages over
unstructured or clinical assessments. It focuses an assessor on the specific
abilities needed for the capacity to vote and also may provide a basis for
educating the person being evaluated so that they might acquire sufficient
understanding to achieve capacity. What an instrument cannot do is determine
which scores represent adequate capacity. The extremes of performance are not
controversial: a score of 0 clearly indicates lack of ability, and a score of 6 on the
CAT-V questions indicates adequate capacity. But intermediate scores require a
judgment to be made, the basis of which is not clear at this point. Data on the
performance of samples without dementia may be helpful in identifying
appropriate cut-offs to aid decision-makers.
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Implementing Assessment of Capacity to Vote. The existence of capacity-
screening instruments raises important questions about the circumstances that
should trigger such screening, the contexts in which it should occur, and the
identity of the persons who should conduct it. Underlying these questions are
concerns that indiscriminate screening may result in the disenfranchisement of
the elderly in general or in the selective deletion of elderly persons from the
221voting rolls for partisan gain. More optimistically, used properly, there is the
potential for instruments like the CAT-V to identify persons likely to have
impaired capacities to vote so that they can be helped to achieve higher levels of
functioning, as has been demonstrated for decisions about medical treatment and
research. Although we cannot thoroughly consider all of these issues here, this
Section is intended to open the discussion.
The least controversial use of assessments (whether structured or not) of
capacity to vote will occur in the context of guardianship proceedings in the
courts. As noted above, some states require that voting capacity be determined in
the course of adjudicating the need for a guardian, while others appear to permit
such judgments to be made. With criteria for assessing capacity to vote now
available, attorneys and judges will be able to direct assessors (usually
physicians, including psychiatrists, or non-physician mental health professionals,
such as psychologists or social workers) to concrete guidelines on which to base
their determinations of an allegedly incompetent person's ability to vote. In turn,
rather than relying on impressionistic judgments, inappropriately basing an
opinion about competence to vote on criteria related to global functioning, or
determining competence on the basis of a person's status (e.g., suffering from a
mental illness, mental retardation, or dementia, or being under guardianship), the
assessors will have available the CAT-V, and perhaps other instruments, to assist
in their task. To the extent that there is disagreement over a person's capacity to
vote, the argument will turn on the interpretation of a common set of data, rather
than each side relying on disparate impressions gathered in different ways.
Ultimately, it will be up to a judge to make a decision regarding whether a person
who may be subject to guardianship will also be deprived of his or her right to
cast a vote.
How else might efforts to assess voting capacity be triggered? In theory, a
person's appearance or behavior at the time of registering to vote or casting a
ballot might raise questions about his or her competence. For example, a person
could arrive at the registrar's office or polling place looking confused and
disheveled, such that a reasonable person would question the person's capacity to
vote even under the minimally demanding criteria defined by Washington State
and Doe. Should registrars of voters or polling officials be given copies of a
screening instrument, such as the CAT-V, and instructed to administer it in such
221. Jason H. Karlawish et al., Addressing the Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues Raised by Voting by
Persons with Dementia, 292 JAMA 1345 (2004).
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circumstances? The risk of decisions being made by persons untrained in the
clinical assessment of mental states, with possible partisan motivations to
exclude particular persons from the voting booth, suggests that the answer to this
question should be "No." In the event of questions being raised at the time of
registration or voting about a person's voting capacity, registration should be
permitted to take place or a vote to be cast, but the registration form or ballot
should be impounded until such questions are resolved 2 Jurisdictions should
have mechanisms in place for neutral decision-makers to determine voters'
competence and to decide on the legitimacy of their registration or ballot.
223
Perhaps still more difficult are the questions that arise routinely in congregate
living settings for the elderly, including long-term care facilities, such as assisted
living residences and nursing homes. Although little empirical work has been
done to describe the dynamics of voting in these facilities, an initial study of
long-term care facilities in Philadelphia is instructive. 4 This survey of staff at
forty-five nursing homes and thirty-nine assisted living settings revealed that in
approximately two-thirds of these facilities, staff members assessed whether
residents were capable of voting before deciding whether to take them to the
polls or to assist them in completing absentee ballots.225 The standards used for
this assessment were often idiosyncratic and not in keeping with legally
prescribed approaches (e.g., "We can assess if a resident is aware who the
president is, who the mayor is. Then I will ask if they want to vote. They can vote
based on their answers and the ability to answer the questions.").2 6 As one
participant described the process in her facility, staff members asked, "Is this
person aware there is an election going on? What it's for? Is it for the mayor, for
the president, or whatever? The irony is that a lot of people who are able to vote
would also fail this test. . . It's pretty subjective on my part. 227 The people
involved were most often activities therapists, recreational therapists, or social
workers, who are not likely to be trained in applicable election law.228
222. Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301 to 15545). The Act required provisions for provisional ballots for persons whose
names do not appear on the voting list at their polling place or who cannot produce the necessary identification.
Id.
223. Referral to a court of appropriate jurisdiction is one obvious mechanism to accomplish this end, but
more efficient non-judicial approaches might also be imagined, and could be preferable so long as potential
voters' due process rights were protected and adverse decisions could be appealed to the courts. In 2006
Wisconsin established the process for a municipal elector to petition the court in a specific proceeding to
determine capacity to vote that does not require the appointment of a guardian. See WIS. STAT. ANN. §
54.25(2)(c)1.g (West Supp. 2006).
224. See Jason H. Karlawish et al., Identifying the Barriers and Challenges to Voting by Residents in
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As a threshold question, it might be asked whether any screening at all ought
to take place at long-term care facilities. If residents are registered voters, why
should they not be permitted to vote, or at least attempt to do so? The answer
relates to the realities of long-term care at several levels. First, since most long-
term care facilities are not polling places, and many residents (perhaps most) will
not be able to get to a polling place on their own, staff time and resources are
required to transport them there and back. It would be wasteful and costly to ask
facilities to transport to the polls all residents who said they wanted to be taken
there, regardless of their degree of mental impairment, and it is unlikely that
facilities would do so. Even for residents who are casting absentee ballots, some
staff assistance frequently will be required, either in alerting them to the
existence of deadlines or in helping them to complete the ballot forms. Again,
particularly in facilities with a large percentage of severely demented residents, it
seems wasteful of scarce resources to instruct staff members to assist every
resident in this process, perhaps taking many hours of time, even when it appears
clear that the residents are too confused to be able to understand what their
participation is about. Finally, facility staff members are themselves citizens who
have certain opinions about the integrity of the electoral process that may be at
odds with a directive to assist every person in voting, regardless of that person's
level of impairment. Not only are staff members' views about the electoral
process likely to be impacted negatively, but in the real world they are simply
unlikely to comply with requirements of this sort.
To suggest that some sort of screening may be necessary in long-term care
facilities, however, is not necessarily to indicate that such procedures should be
entrusted to the staff members of the facilities. It would seem preferable for
election officials to visit facilities to conduct registration and voting, as now
occurs in some states. Should questions arise in this process about the
competence of a potential voter, election staff and not staff members of the
facility would be in a position to make initial judgments. In this context,
screening instruments like the CAT-V might be used to help identify persons for
whom more formal determinations of capacity might be required, whether
judicial or administrative, according to the law in that jurisdiction. Although even
this use of a screening test might be questioned on the usual grounds that it might
lead to the identification of persons who otherwise would not be excluded from
the polls, such a challenge seems difficult to defend. In facilities with a
substantial number of mentally impaired persons, at least some of whom are
likely to have lost the capacity to vote, election officials will need assistance in
efficiently identifying those at highest risk of impaired capacity. So long as a
CAT-V score in itself is not the ultimate determinant of whether a person can
vote, but merely triggers a referral of the question to a neutral decision-maker,
and the process has appropriate protections for the resident's rights, a screening
instrument would appear to play a helpful role. And if residents are truly
incompetent to vote, then excluding them from doing so in fact protects the
integrity of the electoral process.
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Experience with competence assessment instruments in medical settings
suggests another way in which screening instruments for voting capacity could
advance the interests of voters whose capacity to vote is being challenged and
simultaneously guard the electoral process. Studies have shown that patients with
impaired capacities, usually persons with mental illnesses, can sometimes be
assisted to regain functionality by remedial interventions.29 For example, patients
who cannot understand a recommended medical procedure or appreciate its
implications with the usual disclosure of information may be able to learn the
facts and appreciate their significance if more strenuous efforts at education are
made. In this regard, many such impaired patients can be thought of as similar to
persons with learning disabilities, who may find it hard to learn new material but
can do so if extra time is available and alternative approaches (i.e., making use of
other sensory modalities) are employed. Similarly, it will be worth exploring
whether persons identified as likely to have impaired voting capacity can be
helped by remedial efforts to regain an understanding of the nature and effect of
voting or the ability to make a choice. Should that prove to be the case, it may
mitigate some of the concerns that have been expressed about the impact of
screening tests for capacity to vote.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Protecting the integrity of voting by excluding persons who are thought to be
incompetent to vote has a long history, dating back to the earliest days of the
Republic. Modern conceptions of the right to vote as a bedrock of democracy,
however, imply that only persons so impaired as to be unable to understand the
nature and effect of voting should be susceptible to exclusion. And even such
persons are entitled to rigorous procedural protections before being deprived of
the right to vote. Given that state standards for voting competence are often
circular, archaic, and vague, clearer definitions of voting capacity would allow
more focused assessments to be conducted and more valid determinations to be
made. Structured assessment instruments may have a role to play here, as part of
a procedure aimed at maximizing the involvement of all persons with adequate
capacity in the electoral process.
229. See William T. Carpenter et al., Decisional Capacity for Informed Consent in Schizophrenia
Research, 57 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 533 (2000); Laura B. Dunn et al., Enhancing Comprehension of
Consent for Research in Older Patients with Psychosis: A Randomized Study of a Novel Consent Procedure,
158 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1911 (2001).
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Limited guardianship is permitted for "incapacitated persons"
but the constitution bars the "mentally incompetent" from
voting.
The "incapacitated person" retains all rights, and the guardian
may not prohibit the ward from voting. The constitutional
voting bar to those with "unsound mind" has been repealed.
Limited guardianship is permitted for "incapacitated
persons," but the constitution bars "incapacitated persons"
from voting.
The "incapacitated person" retains all civil rights, and the
guardian must petition to authorize the "incapacitated person"
to vote, while the constitution bars "idiot[s] and insane"
persons.
The court may limit adult conservatorship for a conservatee
who is unable to properly care for personal needs or manage
finances. The probate court investigator must recommend for
or against voting disqualification by a conservatee with a
biennial review of the conservatee's capability to complete an
affidavit of voter registration, and there is a specific provision
for restoration of voting rights. The constitution allows for
the disqualification while "mentally incompetent," and the
election law cancels registration of those "mentally
incompetent."
Limited guardianship is preferred, and there is no constitu-
tional or election law bar because of incapacity.
Limited guardianship is allowed. The guardian or conservator
may petition to determine voting competency. Institutionali-
zed persons with mental retardation are encouraged to vote
and assisted in voting.
The court must specifically find that a person adjudged
"mentally incompetent," based on clear and convincing
evidence, has a severe cognitive impairment that precludes
exercise of basic voting judgment.
Those judged "mentally incompetent" may not vote, while
"incapacitated persons" retain all rights except those
specifically taken away.
Guardianship court must determine if the "incapacitated
person" retains the right to vote. The constitutional bar to
persons adjudicated to be "mentally incompetent" is limited
by election law to those adjudicated "incapacitated with
respect to voting."














Limited guardianship is preferred for an adult who lacks
sufficient "capacity" to make or communicate significant
responsible decisions concerning his or her health or safety.
Appointment of a guardian is not a determination of the right
to vote, although the constitution bars those who are
"mentally incompetent."
Limited guardianship is preferred for "incapacitated persons";
persons "non compos mentis" may not vote.
Limited. guardianship is encouraged, and the constitutional
bar for incompetents has been removed. Mentally ill patients
and developmentally disabled individuals are encouraged and
assisted in voting.
Limited guardianship is preferred, and there is no constitu-
tional bar.
Limited guardianship is preferred, and there is no constitu-
tional bar.
Limited guardianship is available, if appropriate, with a
separate judicial determination as to competency to vote;
constitutional bar for "idiot[s] and insane persons."
Limited guardianship is allowed. The constitution allows
exclusion for mental illness, but such exclusion has not been
statutorily enacted.
Partial guardianship is preferred for "disabled persons," but
there is a constitutional bar for "idiot[s] or insane persons,"
and voters are removed from election rolls if "incapacitated."
Limited interdictee retains all rights not taken away, and there
is a state policy to encourage voting by persons with mental
retardation.
An "incapacitated person" with limited guardianship retains
all civil.rights except those removed. It is unconstitutional to
bar those "under guardianship with mental illness" without a
specific finding of incapacity to vote.
The appointment of a guardian for a "disabled person" is not
evidence of incompetency and does not modify any civil
right, although the constitution bars those under care of
guardianship for "mental disability."
Guardianship is permitted for those "mentally ill or mentally
retarded or spendthrift," and there is a constitutional bar for
persons "under guardianship." However, a Secretary of State
Opinion only excludes those whose guardianship specifically
addresses incompetence to vote.
A person of limited "incapacit[y]" retains all rights. The
Legislature has not the defined constitutional term "mental
incompetency."










A ward retains the right. to vote unless judicially removed.
The constitution bars persons "under guardianship" from
voting.
A guardianship proceeding is used to determine whether
persons are of "unsound mind," while the constitution and
election law bars "idiots and insane persons."
The adjudication of full "incapacity or disability" imposes
legal disabilities provided by law but is not a presumption of
incompetency. Those found partially incapacitated or
disabled are presumed competent with no legal disabilities.
The constitution bars persons with a guardian of estate or
persons of "mental incapacity." Litigation is pending
regarding the constitutionality of disenfranchisement
provisions. 30
The "incapacitated person" retains all civil and political rights
except those expressly limited; constitutional bar of those of
"unsound mind."
Guardianships for "incapacitated persons" are to be limited,
but there is a constitutional bar of those who are "non compos
mentis" and an election law requirement to affirm at the time
of voter registration that the voter has not been officially
found "non compos mentis (mentally incompetent)."
An "incompetent person" is defined to include mentally
incapacitated persons. The constitution bars "idiot[s] or
insane" persons. The election law requires the elections clerk
to cancel the registration of a voter if "insanity or mental
incompetence" is legally established.
Limited guardianship for incapacitated individuals is
preferred with no constitutional bar.
Case law requires an individualized inquiry of "incapacity to
vote." The constitution bars "idiot[s] or insane persons" from
voting, but amendment is pending voter ratification. No
mental health patient may be denied right to vote. The Public
Advocate has advised all persons with disabilities that they
have the same right to vote as everyone else and that only a
judge can remove their right to vote.
The "incapacitated person" retains all rights except those
expressly limited; the constitutional bars "idiots or insane
persons" from voting. "Legal insanity" is ascertained by
certification by the guardianship court.
230. Mo. Prot. & Advocacy Servs., Inc. v. Carnahan, No. 06-3014 (8th Cir. 2007), on appeal sub. noma.
from Prye v. Carnahan, No. 04-4248-CV-C-ODS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46176 (W.D. Mo. July 7, 2004).
















Limited guardianship for "incapacity" is available, and there
is no constitutional bar, but individuals adjudged "income-
petent" are not allowed to register under election law.
A ward with limited incompetence may retain certain rights.
There is no constitutional or election bar.
No "incapacitated" person may be deprived of right to vote,
although the constitution bars "incompetent" persons.
Limited guardianship is available for "incompetent" persons.
There is a constitutional voting bar to "idiot[s] or insane"
persons.
The limited guardian of an incapacitated person may assist
the ward in fulfilling his or her civic duties, and election law
does not prohibit the partially incapacitated person from
voting unless specifically restricted.
"Protected persons" retain all civil rights unless expressly
limited, and persons with "mental handicap" are entitled to
vote unless they are adjudicated "incompetent to vote."
Partially incapacitated persons retain all rights, and there is
no constitutional bar.
The appointment of a limited guardian is preferred for the person
who "lacks capacity to make decisions," and that person retains all
rights unless suspended. There is a constitutional bar of persons
"non compos mentis."
Limited guardianship is allowed for "incapacitated" persons,
but the constitution and election laws disqualify persons by
reason of "mental incompetence."
The appointment of a guardian or conservator does not constitute
a finding of "legal incompetence" unless specified, and the ward
retains all rights. There is a constitutional dis-qualification for
"mental incompetence."
Limited guardianship is preferred, and there is no
constitutional bar.
The "incapacitated" person retains all rights except those
granted to a guardian. There is a constitutional bar for those
determined to be "mentally competent."
Limited guardianship is preferred for "incapacitated" persons.
The constitution bars those who are "mentally incompetent"
but no such restriction is enacted within the election law.
A person with limited guardianship retains all civil rights unless
specifically granted to a guardian. There is no constitutional bar.
The "incapacitated person" under guardianship law is specifically
defined as a person "mentally incompetent" under the constitu-
tion. Guardianship courts may enter a specific order allowing the
right to vote.





The "incapacitated" person does not lose the right to vote
unless the court finds the individual lacks capacity to under-
stand nature and effect of voting such that she or he cannot
make an individual choice. There is a constitutional bar if a
person is declared "mentally incompetent."
A protected person is defined as "mentally incompetent,
mentally retarded, or mentally handicapped," and limited
guardianship is available. But there is a constitutional bar for
those who are "mentally incompetent" and an election law
bar for those of "unsound mind."
The court must make a specific finding in separate
proceeding as to "competence to vote." There is a constitu-
tional bar for those found to be "incompetent or partially
incompetent" unless they are found to be capable of
understanding the objective of the elective process.
The term "incompetent person" is used consistently in
guardianship law, constitution, and election law as a person
ineligible to vote.
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